Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Sarah Marshall, a pet-sitter, was bitten by a pit bull mix named Julian while attempting to separate a dog fight. Julian had been placed with Loren Poss by Tulsa Animal Welfare, a department within the City of Tulsa. Poss, who was fostering Julian, left him with Marshall while she went on vacation. Marshall sued the City of Tulsa under the strict liability dog bite statute, 4 O.S. § 42.1, and for common law negligence.The District Court of Tulsa County granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that Marshall was considered an "owner" of the dog under 4 O.S. § 42.1 and thus could not recover under the statute. The court also found that the City did not owe a duty of care to Marshall. Marshall appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Marshall was indeed an "owner" under 4 O.S. § 42.1 when read in conjunction with the Tulsa Municipal Ordinance, which defines an owner as anyone having care, maintenance, or control of a dog. The court also held that the City did not owe a duty of care to Marshall because her injury was not foreseeable, as there was no evidence that Julian had shown signs of aggression prior to the incident. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. View "MARSHALL v. CITY OF TULSA" on Justia Law

Benjamin Benfer and his wife were pulled over by Officer Barry Calvert for allegedly running a red light and because their vehicle matched the description of a stolen car. A confrontation ensued, during which Calvert used his K-9 to subdue Benfer. Both Benfer and his wife were arrested and charged with resisting arrest and interference with public duties, but the charges were later dismissed.Benfer filed a lawsuit against Calvert and the City of Baytown under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, claiming violations of his constitutional rights and state tort claims. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case, ruling that Calvert did not violate Benfer’s constitutional rights, that Benfer’s state tort claims were not valid under Texas law, and that Benfer did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Calvert had reasonable suspicion to stop Benfer, probable cause to arrest him for resisting arrest, and did not use excessive force in deploying his K-9. The court also found that Benfer’s state law assault claim against Calvert was barred by the Texas Tort Claims Act, which requires such claims to be brought against the municipality, not the individual officer. Additionally, the court ruled that Benfer failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claims against the City of Baytown for inadequate policies, failure to train, and ratification of Calvert’s conduct. View "Benfer v. City of Baytown" on Justia Law

A man named Alonzo Kyles was indicted for animal cruelty after police found a cat soaked in bleach in an apartment building's basement stairwell. Kyles admitted to pouring bleach to scare the cat away because he was afraid of cats. The cat had red and swollen paws, no collar, and was unclaimed by anyone in the building. The cat was taken to an animal hospital where a veterinarian treated it for ulcerations, a common symptom of bleach exposure. Kyles was found guilty of animal cruelty and sentenced to nine months in jail.The Eighth District Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed Kyles's conviction. The court held that the statute under which Kyles was convicted, R.C. 959.131(C), required the State to prove that the cat was a "companion animal." The court interpreted the statute to mean that only dogs and cats that are "kept" qualify as companion animals. Since the State did not provide sufficient evidence that the cat was "kept," the court found the conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Eighth District's decision. The court held that R.C. 959.131(C) protects all dogs and cats, not just those that are "kept." The court emphasized that the statute's language includes "any dog or cat regardless of where it is kept," meaning the protection extends to all dogs and cats without regard to their living situation. The case was remanded to the Eighth District Court of Appeals to consider Kyles's remaining arguments. View "State v. Kyles" on Justia Law

The case involves the Schrivers, who sought damages after their cat, Gypsy, died following a veterinary procedure and was subjected to an unauthorized necropsy by Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore Animal Hospital. The Schrivers claimed non-economic damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship, arguing that the emotional bond between pet and owner should be compensable. They also sought economic damages based on the pet's value to them.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore on several claims, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court denied the Schrivers' claim for emotional distress damages related to trespass to chattels/conversion but allowed the "value to owner" measure of economic damages for the loss of Gypsy.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the denial of emotional distress damages for trespass to chattels/conversion, agreeing that such damages are limited to independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, holding that veterinarians do not have a duty to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related to the unauthorized necropsy, finding that a jury should decide if the conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court affirmed the use of the "value to owner" measure of damages, excluding sentimental value.The case was remanded for further proceedings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Schrivers were awarded costs on appeal, but attorney fees were not granted to Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore, as the primary issue of liability remains unresolved. View "Schriver v. Raptosh" on Justia Law

Dr. Ronald S. Hines, a retired and physically disabled veterinarian licensed in Texas, provided online pet-care advice without physically examining the animals. Texas law requires veterinarians to establish a veterinarian-client-patient relationship (VCPR) through an in-person examination or a visit to the premises where the animal is kept before offering veterinary advice. Dr. Hines was penalized for violating this requirement, receiving probation, a fine, and being forced to retake a licensing exam. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing that it unconstitutionally restricted his speech.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially dismissed Dr. Hines's First Amendment claim, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further consideration in light of new Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the law regulated Dr. Hines's speech in a content-neutral way and survived intermediate scrutiny. Dr. Hines appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the physical-examination requirement primarily regulated Dr. Hines's speech rather than his conduct. The court found that the State failed to demonstrate that the harms it sought to address with the law were real and that the law alleviated these harms in a direct and material way. The court also concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests, as it burdened substantially more speech than necessary. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for Dr. Hines, upholding his First Amendment rights. View "Hines v. Pardue" on Justia Law

A resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States precludes the application of a federal cockfighting prohibition. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of this prohibition. The federal cockfighting prohibition, codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and amended in 2018, made cockfighting illegal in all U.S. jurisdictions, including the CNMI.The U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the federal cockfighting prohibition applied to the CNMI under the Covenant. The district court determined that 7 U.S.C. § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as required by Covenant § 502, and thus also applicable to the CNMI. The court also found that Covenant § 105, which governs laws enacted after January 9, 1978, did not apply to amendments of laws that existed on that date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Covenant § 502 governs the applicability of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and its 2018 Amendment to the CNMI. The court found that § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as of January 9, 1978, and thus applicable to the CNMI. The court also held that even if Covenant § 105 were to govern, the federal cockfighting prohibition would still apply to the CNMI because it is applicable to the several states and does not impermissibly intrude upon the internal affairs of the CNMI. The court concluded that the federal interests in regulating interstate commerce, ensuring the humane treatment of animals, and preventing the spread of avian flu outweighed any intrusion into the CNMI’s internal affairs. The judgment was affirmed. View "SALAS V. USA" on Justia Law

Deputy James Killian responded to a domestic disturbance call at the home of Rubicela Ramirez and Francisco Gonzales. Upon arrival, Killian heard sounds suggesting a fight and entered the home without a warrant. Within the first minute, he pepper-sprayed Ramirez and Gonzales and shot their two dogs. Ramirez and Gonzales filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights due to warrantless entry, excessive force, and unreasonable seizure of their dog.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Killian on the warrantless entry and excessive force claims, citing qualified immunity. However, the court allowed the unreasonable seizure claim regarding the shooting of one of the dogs to proceed to trial. The jury found Killian liable and awarded damages to Ramirez and Gonzales. Killian then moved for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court granted, overturning the jury's verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the warrantless entry claim, agreeing that exigent circumstances justified Killian's entry. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the excessive force claims, finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Killian's use of pepper spray and physical force was excessive and unreasonable. The court also reversed the district court's judgment as a matter of law on the unreasonable seizure claim, reinstating the jury's verdict. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the excessive force claims. View "Ramirez v. Killian" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, Christopher Montoya, was convicted of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, kidnapping, aggravated identity theft, unlawful use of means of transportation, theft, and two counts of animal cruelty. Montoya was sentenced to death for the murder charge. The crimes occurred after Montoya's relationship with the victim, A.R., ended, leading him to break into her house, attack, and ultimately kill her. Montoya also used A.R.'s personal information and belongings for his benefit after her death.The Superior Court in Maricopa County handled the initial trial, where Montoya pleaded guilty to all charges and admitted to two capital aggravators: committing previous serious offenses and murdering A.R. in an especially cruel and heinous manner. Despite his guilty plea, Montoya waived the presentation of most mitigation evidence, allowing only the records of his guilty pleas and mitigation waiver hearings to be submitted as evidence of his acceptance of responsibility. The jury returned a death verdict, and the court sentenced Montoya to death for the murder and to a combined 103 years in prison for the other charges.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. The court affirmed Montoya’s convictions and sentences, including the death penalty. The court found no fundamental errors in the trial process, including the handling of voir dire, the admission of autopsy photographs, and the acceptance of Montoya’s waiver of mitigation evidence. The court also determined that the jury instructions were adequate and that the victim impact statements did not fundamentally prejudice Montoya’s right to a fair trial. The court conducted an independent review of the death sentence and concluded that a reasonable jury could have found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to warrant leniency. View "STATE OF ARIZONA v MONTOYA" on Justia Law

The defendant, Allan Washburn, appeals a criminal division order granting the State’s motion for civil forfeiture of his dog, Chad, based on findings of animal cruelty. On three separate occasions, Chad was found locked in the defendant’s car under conditions that included high temperatures, lack of water, and unsanitary environments. The dog was observed to be in distress, unable to move freely, and suffering from malnutrition and lack of exercise. These incidents led to the defendant being issued a criminal citation for animal cruelty and the subsequent seizure of Chad.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, reviewed the case and found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had subjected Chad to cruelty. The court credited testimony from animal control officers and humane officers who described the poor conditions Chad was kept in, including high temperatures inside the car, lack of water, and inadequate nutrition. The court also noted that Chad required medical attention upon being taken to an animal center. Based on these findings, the court granted the State’s motion for civil forfeiture of Chad.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and addressed three main arguments raised by the defendant: the criminal division’s jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding, the sufficiency of evidence for animal cruelty, and the admissibility of lay witness testimony regarding the car’s internal temperature. The court found no error in the lower court’s jurisdiction or its findings of animal cruelty. The court also determined that any potential error in admitting the temperature estimate was harmless, as there was ample other evidence supporting the finding of cruelty. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant the civil forfeiture of Chad. View "State v. Washburn" on Justia Law

A state trooper brought his patrol vehicle to a car dealership for service, accompanied by his canine, Diesel. During the visit, Diesel attacked and injured an employee, Cristina Berrier, without provocation. Berrier suffered serious injuries and subsequently sued the Minnesota State Patrol, alleging negligence and later indicating her intention to pursue a claim under Minnesota’s strict liability dog-bite statute, Minn. Stat. § 347.22.The district court denied the State Patrol’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Berrier’s complaint sufficiently pleaded her statutory claim and that the dog-bite statute waived sovereign immunity. The State Patrol appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the State Patrol was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The appellate court did not address whether Berrier adequately pleaded her statutory dog-bite claim.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine if the dog-bite statute waived sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the language of Minn. Stat. § 347.22, which imposes liability on the "owner" of a dog, was sufficiently plain, clear, and unmistakable to waive sovereign immunity. The court emphasized that the statute’s broad application to any dog owner, including state entities, served the public policy interest of protecting individuals from dog attacks and ensuring their full recovery. Consequently, the court reversed the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hennesy vs. Minnesota State Patrol" on Justia Law