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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of copyright infringement claims brought by a monkey over selfies he took on a wildlife photographer's unattended camera. Naruto, a crested macaque, took several photos of himself on the camera, and the photographer and Wildlife Personalities subsequently published the Monkey Selfies in a book. PETA filed suit as next friend to Naruto, alleging copyright infringement. The panel held that the complaint included facts sufficient to establish Article III standing because it alleged that Naruto was the author and owner of the photographs and had suffered concrete and particularized economic harms; the monkey's Article III standing was not dependent on the sufficiency of PETA; but Naruto lacked statutory standing because the Copyright Act did not expressly authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits. Finally, the panel granted defendants' request for attorneys' fees on appeal. View "Naruto v. Slater" on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of copyright infringement claims brought by a monkey over selfies he took on a wildlife photographer's unattended camera. Naruto, a crested macaque, took several photos of himself on the camera, and the photographer and Wildlife Personalities subsequently published the Monkey Selfies in a book. PETA filed suit as next friend to Naruto, alleging copyright infringement. The panel held that the complaint included facts sufficient to establish Article III standing because it alleged that Naruto was the author and owner of the photographs and had suffered concrete and particularized economic harms; the monkey's Article III standing was not dependent on the sufficiency of PETA; but Naruto lacked statutory standing because the Copyright Act did not expressly authorize animals to file copyright infringement suits. Finally, the panel granted defendants' request for attorneys' fees on appeal. View "Naruto v. Slater" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., seeking to enjoin defendants' mistreatment of endangered species. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order that the endangered species be transferred to another facility and denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs. Determining that plaintiffs had standing, the court held that the district court did not err in finding defendants had harassed the lemurs by keeping them in social isolation; by not developing, documenting, and following an appropriate plan for environmental enhancement; and by not providing clean water and sanitary conditions. The district court also did not err by ruling that defendants had injured, and thereby harmed, the tigers by failing to provide timely and appropriate veterinary care. Furthermore, the decision to imposed upon defendants the responsibility of finding an appropriate, licensed facility for the lemurs and tigers was well within the district court's broad equitable powers. The court held that the circumstances of this case justified the denial of attorney fees and costs. The court rejected the remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Kuehl v. Sellner" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., seeking to enjoin defendants' mistreatment of endangered species. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order that the endangered species be transferred to another facility and denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees and costs. Determining that plaintiffs had standing, the court held that the district court did not err in finding defendants had harassed the lemurs by keeping them in social isolation; by not developing, documenting, and following an appropriate plan for environmental enhancement; and by not providing clean water and sanitary conditions. The district court also did not err by ruling that defendants had injured, and thereby harmed, the tigers by failing to provide timely and appropriate veterinary care. Furthermore, the decision to imposed upon defendants the responsibility of finding an appropriate, licensed facility for the lemurs and tigers was well within the district court's broad equitable powers. The court held that the circumstances of this case justified the denial of attorney fees and costs. The court rejected the remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Kuehl v. Sellner" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's petition for writ of administrative mandate after the county planning commission and board of supervisors denied her application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to keep up to five tigers on her property. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the project was not compatible with the planned uses in the general area and the project was detrimental to the public interest, health, safety or welfare. In this case, tigers did not belong in a residential area and there was more than ample evidence to support a finding that plaintiff's tigers posed a danger to the public. View "Hauser v. Ventura County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's petition for writ of administrative mandate after the county planning commission and board of supervisors denied her application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to keep up to five tigers on her property. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the project was not compatible with the planned uses in the general area and the project was detrimental to the public interest, health, safety or welfare. In this case, tigers did not belong in a residential area and there was more than ample evidence to support a finding that plaintiff's tigers posed a danger to the public. View "Hauser v. Ventura County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

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The language of Ky. Rev. Stat. 258.235(4) imposes strict liability upon the owner of a dog that attacks and injures a person. Plaintiff sued Defendant after Defendant’s dogs attacked and injured her, relying on section 258.235(4). After the conclusion of the evidence, Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested instruction requiring an imposition of liability upon Defendant solely by showing Defendant’s ownership of the dogs that attacked her. The jury determined that Defendant was the owner of the dogs that caused injury to Plaintiff but that Defendant was not liable to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the jury instructions properly stated the law of a dog owner’s liability for injuries caused by his dog. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that a dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused when his dog attacks a person and that a plaintiff’s comparative negligence in a dog bite case may be considered in measuring the damages awarded to her. View "Maupin v. Tankersley" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of a single violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-247, a provision that criminalizes a broad range of acts of cruelty to animals, stemming from Defendant’s shooting of his neighbor’s cat with a BB gun. The court held (1) the trial court properly concluded that the clause of section 53-247(a) applicable to Defendant’s conviction, which bars a person from “unjustifiably injur[ing]” an animal, requires only a general intent to engage in the behavior causing the injury; (2) the phrase “justifiably injures” in section 53-247(a) is not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. View "State v. Josephs" on Justia Law

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PETA filed suit against Seaquarium, alleging that it perpetrated an unlawful take by harming or harassing Lolita, a killer whale, in violation of section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1)(B). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Seaquarium, but did not agree that actionable harm or harassment included only deadly or potentially deadly harm. Rather, the court held that Seaquarium was entitled to summary judgment because the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to PETA, did not support the conclusion that the conditions of her captivity pose a threat of serious harm to Lolita. View "People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium" on Justia Law

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The DC Circuit affirmed the Service's 2014 and 2015 findings that information concerning the size of the Zimbabwean elephant population and status of conservation efforts in Zimbabwe did not support a conclusion that killing the animal would enhance the survival of the species. The court rejected appellants' contention that the Service erred because it applied a standard that was more stringent than the "enhance" standard in the Service's regulation. However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Service on a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553, because the Service erred in adopting the findings without first following the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of the APA. The court remanded with instructions. View "Safari Club International v. Zinke" on Justia Law