Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Department of Agriculture regulations promulgated under the federal Animal Welfare Act (with exceptions), prohibit those who buy and sell dogs and cats from obtaining animals from an individual donor “who did not breed and raise them on … premises.” A dealer must obtain certification that the animals were born and raised on that person’s premises. Woudenberg sells animals for use in medical research. Some are donated. Before accepting dogs and cat from four donors, Woudenberg required each to complete and sign a release: I Certify that I have bred, raised, and do own the animal(s) listed below, and I understand that they may be used in research or testing. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), a USDA agency, reviewed Woudenberg’s records and contacted the donors, who admitted that they had not raised the animals from birth and that the animals were owned previously by others. An ALJ dismissed, reasoning that the “regulations do not hold dealers strictly liable.” The USDA reversed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the regulation is clear that a dealer violates the law by obtaining an animal from a donor who did not breed or raise it on the donor’s premises. It is a violation even when the dealer in good faith obtained certifications. Certification is an enforcement mechanism for the prohibition, not an exception. View "Woudenberg v. Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

Bertucci pleaded guilty to shooting and killing a bald eagle and a hawk, 16 U.S.C. 668(a), 703, and 707. Bertucci had a criminal history score of two; his offense level was 10, with a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A)(ii) and 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) based on "loss" amounts for the birds that exceeded $10,000 but did not exceed $30,000 and a two-level enhancement under 2Q2.1(b)(1)(B) for a "pattern of similar violations" because Bertucci was convicted in 2009 for possession of bald eagle feathers. There were several paragraphs concerning previous assaults that Bertucci had allegedly committed. Bertucci argued that the court had adopted a $2,000 valuation for bald eagles in the 2009 prosecutions of him and his brother and that the allegations of assault were baseless. The court denied Bertucci's objections and sentenced him to eight months' imprisonment with a special condition of supervised release that required Bertucci to "successfully complete, and pay for any diagnostic evaluations and treatment or counseling programs for anger management." The court imposed a "financial obligation" on Bertucci: $5000.00 for the eagle and $1500.00 for the hawk. The Eighth Circuit vacated the sentence, stating that the court failed to establish the basis for requiring counseling; that the financial obligation constituted restitution; and that the valuation was not justified. View "United States v. Bertucci" on Justia Law

Lynn Eshleman was employed with the DeKalb County Police Department as a law enforcement officer and dog handler, and in connection with her employment, she took care of Andor, a police dog trained to assist in the apprehension of persons suspected of criminal activity. When Eshleman was off-duty, Andor lived with her at her Walton County home, down the street from Benjamin Key. One day in 2011, Eshleman put Andor into a portable kennel outside her home, but she evidently failed to secure the kennel door. As a result, Andor escaped into the neighborhood, where the dog encountered Key’s eleven-year-old son. According to Key, the dog attacked his son, causing the child to sustain serious injuries to his arm. Key sued Eshleman, alleging that she failed to restrain Andor, and Eshleman moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion, Eshleman appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In this case, there was no evidence that DeKalb County gave specific direction to Eshleman about the extent to which she was to keep Andor restrained when she was not working. Key argued that the law imposed an absolute and sufficiently specific duty upon Eshleman to keep the dog under restraint, and in support of this contention, pointed to OCGA 51-2-7 and a Walton County ordinance. The statute recognized that "the keeper of an animal known to have vicious or dangerous propensities owed a duty of care with respect to the management and restraint of the animal for the protection of those who may come into contact with it." But the question, in the context of official immunity, was not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that was particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one. "The duties that Eshleman was alleged to have violated were not ministerial ones because, although the duties reflected in OCGA 51-2-7 and the county ordinance may be definite, they do not require merely the carrying out of a specified task. [. . .] They require, instead, an exercise of personal deliberation and judgment about what is reasonable in the particular circumstances presented." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that denial was also reversed. View "Eshelman v. Key" on Justia Law

Tinkerbell, a female pit bull terrier, injured a neighbor child who was playing in the yard of Michael and Kim Blatt. The circuit court ordered that Tinkerbell, the family pet of the Blatts, be euthanized pursuant to West Virginia’s vicious dog statute. In making its decision, the circuit court relied on a presumption that pit bull dog breeds are inherently vicious. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s destruction order, holding (1) because extensive debate exists over whether scientific evidence and social concerns justify breed-specific presumptions, courts may not, upon judicial notice, rely solely upon a breed-specific presumption in ordering the destruction of a dog pursuant to W. Va. Code 19-20-20; and (2) the facts and circumstances surrounding the bite in this case did not support the circuit court’s determination that Tinkerbell is dangerous within the meaning of section 19-20-20. View "State v. Blatt" on Justia Law

This case concerns Lolita, a killer whale held in captivity since 1970, who performs each day at the Seaquarium. ALDF filed suit against the USDA for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Seaquarium houses Lolita in conditions that violate the Animal Welfare Act's (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131-59, standards for granting a license under 7 U.S.C. 2133-34. The district court granted summary judgment to USDA. The court held that USDA’s renewal of Seaquarium’s April 2012 license is a final agency action subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. 706(2). On the merits, the court concluded that USDA’s licensing regulations constitute a reasonable policy choice balancing the conflicting congressional aims of due process and animal welfare, and the AWA licensing scheme is entitled to deference by the court. USDA has the discretionary enforcement authority to revoke a license due to noncompliance. Only Congress possesses the power to limit the agency’s discretion and demand annual, substantive compliance with animal welfare standards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. USDA" on Justia Law

Janet Olier was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Donna Bailey's yard. In attempting to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Olier sued Bailey under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the "dangerous propensity" rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Olier was a licensee on Bailey's property and that Bailey did not breach her duty of care toward Olier. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Olier ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Olier appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed. Olier then filed this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that, while Olier could not, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she could proceed under the dangerous propensity theory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Olier v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Mike McGarland and Contender Farms challenge a USDA regulation promulgated under the Horse Protection Act (HPA), 15 U.S.C. 1821-31, requiring that private entities, known as Horse Industry Organizations (HIOs), impose mandatory suspensions on those participants found to engage in a practice known as "soring." The court affirmed the district court's holding as to justiciability where plaintiffs, regular participants in the Tennessee walking horse industry, have standing to challenge the Regulation and present a ripe challenge to it. On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the Regulation is a valid application of USDA regulatory authority under the HPA. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the USDA. The court remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "Contender Farms v. USDA" on Justia Law

After issuing an environmental impact statement (EIS), the National Park Service adopted a plan for the management of deer in Rock Creek National Park in Washington, D.C. The plan involved the killing of white-tailed deer. Objectors argued that the plan violated statutes governing management of the Park and was not adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the EIS did not meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Noting that the Organic Act expressly provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may also provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any said parks, monuments, or reservations,” so that the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act is reasonable. Given the impact of deer on plant life and vehicle collisions, the decision is not arbitrary. Finding no violation of NEPA, the court concluded that the EIS was not required to consider the psychological harm that some visitors may suffer from simply knowing that the intentional killing of deer happens at Rock Creek Park. View "Grunewald v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against AQHA, alleging violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, and Texas antitrust law. Plaintiffs' allegations stemmed from votes by the Stud Book and Registration Committee of the AQHA, which had blocked AQHA registration of horses created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT or cloning). On appeal, AQHA challenged the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL). The court concluded that reasonable jurors could not draw any inference of conspiracy from the evidence presented, because it neither tends to exclude the possibility of independent action nor does it suggest the existence of any conspiracy at all. Therefore, the court concluded that the JMOL motion should have been granted in the absence of substantial evidence on the issue of an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade under Section 1 of the Act. Further, the Section 2 claim failed as a matter of law because AQHA is not a competitor in the allegedly relevant market for elite Quarter Horses. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for AQHA. View "Abraham & Veneklasen Joint Venture v. American Quarter Horse Assoc." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant-appellant Rodney Brossart guilty of terrorizing, preventing arrest, and failing to comply with the law for estray animals. In 2011, two of Brossart's adult children observed three cow-calf pairs loose on or near Brossart's property and they determined the cattle did not belong to Brossart. The cattle were secured in a fenced "missile site" Brossart leased. One of Brossart's children told him about the cattle after the cattle were secured. The following day, neighbor Chris Anderson discovered three cow-calf pairs had escaped from his fenced property. Anderson tracked the cattle to Brossart's property and spoke to Brossart about the cattle. According to Anderson, Brossart informed him that he would have to buy the cattle back. Anderson returned to his farm and contacted the Nelson County Sheriff's Department. Eric Braathen, a deputy for the Nelson County Sheriff's Department, contacted Fred Frederikson, a licensed peace officer and a brand inspector for the North Dakota Stockmen's Association. While driving to Brossart's farm, Braathen and Frederikson saw Brossart pumping water from a field. Braathen introduced Frederikson to Brossart and Frederikson asked about the cattle and whether he could go look at them. According to Braathen, Brossart informed the officers "if you step foot on my property, you are going to not be walking away." The situation quickly escalated, Braathen attempted to arrest Brossart, Brossart resisted, and Braathen used a taser on Brossart multiple times before he was handcuffed. Brossart was charged with failing to comply with the estray chapter and preventing arrest. He appealed his conviction. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not give the jury any instructions explaining what constituted a threat and that communications that are not a "true threat" are protected speech. The district court therefore did not correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law and erred by failing to include a jury instruction defining what constituted a "threat." Brossart's terrorizing conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on that charge. The Supreme Court affirmed in all other respects. View "North Dakota v. Brossart" on Justia Law