Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a UPS driver, was delivering a package to the home of Defendants when he was bitten on his arm and leg by one of Defendants’ dogs. Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, alleging that he was injured as a result of Defendants’ negligence in failing to secure their dogs. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact about whether Defendants knew of the dog’s vicious propensity. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that material issues of fact existed that could permit a fact-finder that the dog did have a vicious propensity and that Defendants knew of it. View "Coogan v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The flea-and-tick “spot-on products” at issue claim that their active ingredient works by topical application to a pet’s skin rather than through the pet’s bloodstream. According to the manufacturers, after the product is applied to one area, it disperses over the rest of the pet’s body within one day because it collects in the oil glands and natural oils spread the product over the surface of the pet’s skin and “wick” the product over the hair. The plaintiffs alleged false advertising based on statements that the products are self-dispersing and cover the entire surface of the pet’s body when applied in a single spot; that they are effective for one month and require monthly applications to continue to work; that they do not enter the bloodstream; and that they are waterproof and effective after shampooing, swimming, and exposure to rain or sunlight. The district court repeatedly referred to a one-issue case: whether the product covers the pet’s entire body with a single application. The case management order stated that the manufacturers would bear the initial burden to produce studies that substantiated their claims; the plaintiffs would then have to refute the studies, “or these cases will be dismissed.” The manufacturers objected. The plaintiffs argued that the plan would save time, effort, and money. The manufacturers submitted studies. The plaintiffs’ response included information provided by one plaintiff and his adolescent son and an independent examination of whether translocation occurred that detected the product’s active ingredient in a dog’s bloodstream. The district court concluded that the manufacturers’ studies substantiated their claims and denied all of plaintiffs’ discovery requests, except a request for consumer complaints, then granted the manufacturers summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The doctrines of waiver and invited error precluded challenges to the case management plan. View "Simms v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants regarding the roundup, or "gather," of approximately 1,600 wild horses and 160 burros from the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area (HMA). Plaintiffs claimed that the gather violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. 1331-1340, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370. The court held that the BLM did not violate the Act by implementing the 2010 gather on the Twin Peaks HMA; the BLM did not violate NEPA when it decided not to issue an environmental impact statement; and the BLM did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it responded to comments highlighting the possibility of scientific dissent regarding the administration of the immunocontraceptive PZP. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In Defense of Animals v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

Minnesota-based Everest breeds and races thoroughbreds. Crestwood is a thoroughbred farm in Kentucky. The businesses began working together in 1993. The parties entered a more definite arrangement in 2008, for sale of Everest’s horses. Everest would transfer ownership of more than 100 horses to Crestwood, which would pay the horses’ day-to-day costs and would sell the horses at a public auction or a private sale. The agreement prohibited Crestwood from setting a “reserve” on any horse, a price floor below which the sale would not go. Crestwood was to keep 25-50 percent of the proceeds from each sale. The agreement provided that Island Fashion and its unnamed filly would be sold at auction, but remained Everest’s property. Crestwood tried to sell several horses, including the Island Fashion filly. There were bids of $850,000 and $875,000 for the filly. Everest had planted a separate agent at the auction without Crestwood’s knowledge, who tried to drive the selling price higher by placing a $900,000 bid. The sale failed. After learning what Everest had done, Crestwood kept $219,513.89, 25 from selling other horses based on the failed high bid for the filly (plus auction fees). Everest sued and Crestwood counterclaimed. The district court granted summary judgment to Crestwood and awarded $272,486.30 in attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Nielsen v. McLean" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Deskins challenged the sentence she received after a jury found her guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the cruelty to animals statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited her from owning or living with animals as a condition of probation; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to forfeit any remaining animals to the Stevens County Sheriffs Office after giving her seven days to find them new homes; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding to sentencing 22 minutes after the verdict and imposing restitution to reimburse the county for animal care. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture challenge was moot, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all other issues. View "Washington v. Deskins" on Justia Law

In 2011, partners of the Interagency Bison Management Plan decided to expand the territory in the Gardiner basin in which bison were allowed to naturally migrate. That decision was challenged by various petitioners. Park County Stockgrowers Association filed a petition that raised a public nuisance claim, among other claims. That petition was consolidated with another petition, and several other petitioners intervened. Two of the intervenors filed a joint amended petition, which Park County did not join, adding a claim based on changes to Mont. Code Ann. 87-1-216. After a hearing, the district court rejected all of the claims and dismissed all of the petitions. Park County appealed, contending that the district court erred in its interpretation of section 87-1-216. Because Park County neither raised a claim based on section 87-1-216 in the proceedings before the district court, nor adopted the arguments of the other petitioners, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that consolidation did not permit Park County to appeal an issue raised in a separate case by another party. View "Park County Stockgrowers Ass’n v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, committed animal rights activists, filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“Act”), which criminalizes “force, violence, and threats involving animal enterprises,” violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs had never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the Act but claimed that fear of future prosecution and present self-restraint caused them to suffer injury in fact. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish an injury in fact as required by Article III. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated and speculative fear of prosecution under the Act was not a basis for standing under U.S. Const. art. III. View "Blum v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2011, an Ohio man released more than 50 exotic animals before committing suicide. Partially in response, the state enacted the Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, Ohio Rev. Code 935.01–935.99. All persons in possession of dangerous wild animals before September 5, 2012, were required to register with the Ohio Department of Agriculture and to microchip each registered animal upon registration. The Act prohibits possession of a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014. A person already in possession of a dangerous wild animal and wishing to continue to possess the animal after that date may obtain a wildlife shelter permit or a wildlife propagation permit. Owners of exotic animals challenged the Act as violating First Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech, arguing that the permitting requirements are so onerously expensive that the only viable means of compliance would be to join the Association of Zoos and Aquariums or the Zoological Association of America, for which there are exemptions. They argued that they are compelled to associate with those organizations and to subsidize the organizations’ speech and that the microchipping requirement constitutes a physical taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The owners are not compelled to join the AZA or ZAA and the Act does not effect a physical taking.View "Wilkins v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Defendant leased a single-family dwelling to Tenants pursuant to a lease agreement in which Tenants were permitted to keep pets but would be responsible for any property damage or disturbance caused by their pets. Three times in one month, a dog owned by Tenants allegedly attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants seeking damages on a common law theory of negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there were no triable issues as to whether Defendants were ever in possession of control over Tenants' dog, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Fields v. Hayden" on Justia Law

Decedent died as a result of the injuries he received when he was attacked by several pit bull terriers. Petitioner, the administratrix of Decedent's estate, brought this action against Respondents, the Monroe County Commission and Patricia Green, the Monroe County dog warden, alleging, inter alia, that Respondents failed to impound the dogs due to non-payment of taxes and for not having proper registration and failed to impound and/or destroy the dogs for being vicious. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the public duty doctrine and statutory immunities. Petitioner subsequently moved to amend her complaint to incorporate allegations of fact to support her claim that a "special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine applied. Before ruling on the motion to amend, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's case on the basis of statutory immunities and in failing to grant Petitioner's motion to amend her complaint. Remanded. View "Bowden v. Monroe County Comm'n" on Justia Law