Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, foie gras producers and sellers, appealed the district court's denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of California from enforcing California Health & Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 banned the sale of products that were the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. The court dismissed the State of California and Governor Brown from the lawsuit because they were immune from suit. The court concluded that the only product covered by section 25982 at issue in this appeal was foie gras; plaintiffs' Due Process Clause challenge failed because section 25982's definition for force feeding was not vague and the statute gave fair notice of prohibited conduct; and section 25982 did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not discriminatory, did not directly regulate interstate commerce, and did not substantially burden interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to raise a serious question that they were likely to succeed on the merits. View "Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 1992, Mo. Rev. Stat. 273.327 was enacted, requiring persons engaged in commercial animal care to obtain a license and exempted pounds and animal shelters from paying annual licensing and per-capita fees. In 2010, the General Assembly passed S.B. 795, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327. The reenacted version of section 273.327 eliminated animal shelters from the entities exempt from the payment of fees. In 2011, the General Assembly passed S.B. 161, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327 and cured any procedural defects in the passage of S.B. 795. The Humane Society subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting that the amended version of section 273.327 was unconstitutional because S.B. 795 was amended during its passage to change its original purpose. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the Humane Society's cause of action was moot as a result of the General Assembly's repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 in S.B. 161. View "Humane Society of the United States v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of New Castle County, befriended a stray dog called Maggie. They later turned Maggie over to the Kent County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). Subsequently, Petitioners told the SCPA they would like to adopt Maggie. After concluding that the SPCA had euthanized Maggie, Petitioners filed this action, seeking to compel the SPCA to comply with the state's Shelter Standards Law, including strict compliance with its euthanasia requirements. The SPCA moved to dismiss the action, claiming, among other things, that Petitioners lacked standing to pursue their claims. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action, concluding that Petitioners failed to satisfy the "legally protected interest" element of standing because they did not own Maggie, and their statement of interest to adopt Maggie was not sufficient to create a reasonably conceivable legally protected interest in Maggie. View "Gittman-Crowther v. Kent County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received a wound from a dog bite from a pit bull. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, the owner of the building where the dog bite occurred. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding that the dog bite at issue occurred within the enclosure of the owner or keeper of the dog. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the second-floor apartment where the dog bite occurred was a separate enclosure for purposes of R.I. Gen. Laws 4-13-16. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) absent an inquiry into whether the second-floor apartment was kept locked and whether Defendant was excluded from the premises, it was impossible to determine whether the second-floor apartment was a separate enclosure within Defendant's house; and (2) there was a disputed issue of material fact was to whether Defendant knew of or permitted the dog's presence on his premises. View "Carreiro v. Tobin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when the van she was driving hit a cow on a public road. Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the owner of the property where the cow was kept and the two men who may have owned the cow. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for two of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed as to those defendants and also granted summary judgment as to the third defendant, concluding that, pursuant to Bard v. Jahnke, injuries inflicted by domestic animals "may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner's knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rule of Bard does not bar a suit for negligence when a farm animal has been allowed to stray from the property where it is kept. View "Hastings v. Sauve" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Prior to the ride, Plaintiff signed a release (waiver) waiving her right to sue Defendants, Sundance-related entities (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the waiver was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) and that it violated the public policy expressed in the Equine Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Equine Act does not invalidate preinjury releases for ordinary negligence, nor does the Equine Act evidence a public policy bargain struck by the legislature; and (2) therefore, the waiver is enforceable. View "Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. " on Justia Law

The Medlens' dog Avery escaped the family's backyard and was picked up by animal control. Before the Medlens could retrieve Avery, shelter worker Carla Strickland mistakenly placed Avery on the euthanasia list, and Avery was put to sleep. The Medlens sued Strickland for causing Avery's death and sought damages for Avery's "intrinsic value." The trial court dismissed the suit with prejudice, concluding that Texas law barred such damages. The court of appeals reversed, becoming the first Texas court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether emotional-injury damages were recoverable for the negligent destruction of a dog. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under established legal doctrine, recovery in pet-death cases is, barring legislative reclassification, limited to "loss of value, not loss of relationship." View "Strickland v. Medlen" on Justia Law

Defendant Greg Collier was indicted in August 2006 for fourth-degree extreme cruelty to animals after a horse he owned died. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State's request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State could retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State could retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar retrial on the lesser included offense. View "New Mexico v. Collier" on Justia Law

Bumper Boy holds two patents on improvements to electronic animal collars; the 082 patent is a continuation-in-part of the 014 patent. Although the 082 patent contains some new matter, the asserted claims from the 082 patent are supported by the 014 patent specification. Both patents generally disclose and claim a collar having “high point surfaces” that extend the inside surface of the collar above the base of electrodes 24 toward the animal “to relieve and distribute the load caused by collar tension around the animal’s neck” and reduce discomfort. The district court construed “inside surface” as “the portion of the collar housing facing inwards towards the animal” and “electrode base” as “the portion of the electrode where it intersects the inside surface of the collar housing” and held that Radio Shack and Innotek did not infringe the patents. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to claim construction, but reversed with respect to the district court’s reliance on equitable estoppel. View "Radio Sys. Corp. v Lalor" on Justia Law

After a three-year rulemaking process, the FWS found that, due to the effects of global climate change, the polar bear was likely to become an endangered species and faced the threat of extinction within the foreseeable future (Listing Rule). The agency thus concluded that the polar bear should be listed as a threatened species. A number of industry groups, environmental organizations, and states challenged the Listing Rule as either overly restrictive or insufficiently protective of the polar bear. After a hearing on the parties' submissions, the district court granted summary judgment to the FWS and rejected all challenges to the Listing Rule. Given the evident thoroughness and care of the agency's explanation for its decision, the court concluded that the challenges to the Listing Rule "amount to nothing more than competing views about policy and science." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation" on Justia Law