Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a photojournalist, contended that viewing restrictions at a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) horse roundup violated her First Amendment right to observe government activities. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that most of the relief sought was moot because the roundup ended in October 2010. Alternatively, the district court concluded that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because the restrictions did not violate the First Amendment. The court held that, because the preliminary injunction motion sought unrestricted access to future horse roundups, and not just the one that took place in 2010, the case was was not moot. With regards to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the district court erred by failing to apply the well-established qualified right of access balancing test set forth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider in the first instance whether the public had a First Amendment right of access to horse gathers, and if so, whether the viewing restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the government's overriding interests. View "Leigh v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff ranchers sued the State because of ongoing damage to their property from incursions of prairie dogs from public lands. Relying on multiple statutes requiring the State to manage and control prairie dog populations, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, abatement, and damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and ordered a trial on damages. When the case was reassigned, the State moved the new judge to reexamine the first judge's ruling. On reconsideration, the court vacated the first summary judgment and granted summary judgment for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the second circuit court judge did not err in granting summary judgment for the State where the acts mandated by the statutes cited by Plaintiffs were discretionary and the State was protected from suit by sovereign immunity. View "Adrian v. Vonk" on Justia Law

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded. View "Animal Found. of Great Falls v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This case involved the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (Service) removal of the Yellowstone grizzly bear from the threatened species list. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the Service failed to articulate a rational connection between the data in the record and its determination that whitebark pine declines were not a threat to the Yellowstone grizzly, given the lack of data indicating grizzly population stability in the face of such declines, and the substantial data indicating a direct correlation between whitebark pine seed availability and grizzly survival production. The court held, however, that the Service's determination regarding the adequacy of the existing regulatory mechanisms was reasonable and reversed the district court. View "Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Serveheen, et al.; " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs bred their dogs to each other and advertised 11 puppies for sale. Undercover animal services officers visited on the pretense of interest in the puppies. Without a warrant or consent, officers re-entered the home and took all the dogs, stating that they could confiscate the dogs because plaintiffs did not have a breeder's license and that if more than one dog were unlicensed, they could seize all the animals. Neither adult dog was licensed. Before the dogs were released, the adult dogs were neutered, all had identification microchips inserted, and plaintiffs purchased a breeder's license and paid $1,020.95. Plaintiffs were never provided written notice of alleged ordinance violations. The dogs contracted infections that required expensive veterinary treatment. The district court rejected plaintiffs' state law and constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs were not operating a kennel and were not required to obtain a license for a single litter. The court rejected an argument that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using subterfuge, but found that plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to the second, warrantless entry. Characterizing the release of the dogs as having elements of a shakedown, the court found that plaintiffs stated a claim for procedural due process claims. The court rejected substantive due process and equal protection claims. View "O'Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't" on Justia Law

Feld Entertainment, Inc. owned the country's largest collection of endangered Asian elephants, some of whom travel and perform with its famed Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus. In this case, a former barn helper with the circus and an organization dedicated to fighting exploitation of animals alleged that Feld's use of two techniques for controlling the elephants -bullhooks and chains - harmed the animals in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(1). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment. View "ASPCA, et al. v. Feld Entertainment, Inc." on Justia Law

After convicting seven defendants charged with operating a St. Louis area dog-fighting ring, the court sentenced all to a three-year term of supervised release and to payment of $100. Two defendants additionally received sentences of 16 and 18 months of incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the judge did not take on the role of a prosecutor and violate separation of powers by conducting independent research on dog fighting. The judge informed the parties of his research and carefully distinguished information in the memo from evidence related to the defendants. The court adequately justified the sentencing, finding the guidelines inadequate considering the number of dogs, dogs that had to be euthanized, the number of fights, extraordinary cruelty, and the leadership roles of the defendants.View "United States v. Courtland" on Justia Law

Wilgus was arrested for violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 668, which prohibits possession of eagle feathers, but excepts possession for religious purposes of Indian tribes. Wilgus is a follower of a Native American faith and blood-brother to a Paiute, but not a member of a recognized tribe, nor is he Indian by birth. He received at least one feather for religious purposes. Following a remand, the district court held that application of the Eagle Act to Wilgus would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 (RFRA), which prohibits government from substantially burdening religious freedom, except to forward a compelling governmental interest via the least restrictive means. The Tenth Circuit reversed. The government has competing compelling interests in protecting eagles and in preserving Native American religion and culture. The RFRA exception is intended to protect the religion and culture of tribes, not individual practitioners. Tribes are quasi-sovereign political entities; protection of faith practices among the general public might violate the Establishment Clause. The government need not refute every option to satisfy the least restrictive means prong of RFRA; the RFRA exception balances the competing interests. Proposed alternatives, involving creation of a feather repository, opening permits to all sincere adherents to Native American religion, or allowing Native Americans to gift feathers, would either be impractical or have a negative impact on governmental goals.View "United States v. Wilgus" on Justia Law

Respondent Jill Engquist, as parent and natural guardian of minor Amber Engquist, sued Appellants, Steven and Christina Loyas, for injuries Amber sustained as a result of a dog bite that occurred at Appellants' residence. The district court entered judgment in favor of Appellants after finding that Amber provoked the dog to bite her. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the jury instruction given by the district court misstated the meaning of provocation under Minn. Stat. 347.22. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the jury could have found provocation without any consideration of the victim's knowledge of the danger, the jury instructions materially misstated the law and prejudiced Respondent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Engquist v. Loyas" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Romero appealed his three year sentence for aggravated animal cruelty. In 2009, Defendant tied a rope around the neck of "Buddy," a dog belonging to a family in Delta, Colorado, and dragged him to death behind a pick-up truck on federal land. The United States Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence investigation report (PSR), indicating that while Defendant was in jail for killing Buddy and before pleading guilty, he made a series of telephone calls attempting to silence witnesses and procure false grand jury testimony. The PSR recounted Romero’s ten prior felony convictions, poor physical health, mild mental retardation, amphetamine dependence, depression, and “[i]ntermittent [e]xplosive [d]isorder." The presumptive sentence for aggravated animal cruelty was 12-18 months, but that maximum could be doubled under certain circumstances. Upon review of the sentencing court's record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence when sentencing Defendant to 36-months' imprisonment. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "United States v. Romero" on Justia Law