Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. In this case the attack occurred across the street from the rented property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landlords under Ireland v. Raymond, which held that a landlord's liability for attacks by a tenant's dog does not extend to attacks that occur off the leased premises. The court of appeals affirmed, also relying on Ireland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord can be an "owner" of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances; (2) any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (3) for that reason, the landlord in this case was not liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

Fabrikant was arrested and arraigned on five counts of criminal animal cruelty, pursuant to New York Agriculture and Markets Law 353. All but two of her dogs were taken. The seized dogs were spayed or neutered and sent to live in foster homes pending conclusion of the criminal case. Fabrikant was ultimately acquitted but apparently never asked that her seized dogs be returned after the trial. She filed a pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the New York SPCA, several of its employees, and some of the prospective adopters who originally alerted the SPCA about the dogs’ conditions. The complaint included federal claims for malicious prosecution and for violations of her rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Accordingly, although they acted under color of state law, the SPCA defendants were protected by qualified immunity and could not be held liable for the spaying, neutering, or fostering out of Fabrikant’s dogs. Officers had probable cause to search Fabrikant’s house and arrest her. View "Fabrikant v. French" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to interpret the Minnesota dog owner's liability statute. Respondent Gordon Anderson was injured during an attack on his dog by another dog named Bruno, owned by Respondent Neil Christopherson. Anderson, along with his wife, sued Christopherson and his father, arguing, among other claims, that the Christophersons were strictly liable for Anderson's injuries under Minn. Stat. 347.22. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Christophersons, holding (1) the Christophersons were not liable under the statute because Bruno's conduct was not focused on Anderson; and (2) Dennis Christopherson was not liable because he was not an "owner" of Bruno, as that term was defined under the statute. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) a dog owner may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a dog's affirmative conduct regardless of the focus of that conduct; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Anderson's injury was a direct and immediate result of Bruno's conduct and whether Dennis Christopherson was an owner of Bruno under the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for a jury trial on both the question of whether Anderson's injuries were caused by Bruno's conduct under section 347.22 and also the question of whether Dennis Christopherson was an "owner" of Bruno under the statute. View "Anderson v. Christopherson" on Justia Law

Nestle’s BEGGIN’ STRIPS registered mark for pet treats has been in continuous use since 1988 and has been registered since 1989. Midwestern manufactures and sells pet treats and filed an intent-to-use application with the Patent and Trademark Office, seeking to register the mark WAGGIN’ STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats. Nestle opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion between the two marks. The district court ruled in favor of Nestle, finding likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly admitted evidence submitted by Nestle. View "Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant’s llama escaped its pen and wandered off and he was charged with misdemeanor abandonment under the Illinois animal cruelty statute. Rather than hire a lawyer, defendant pled guilty and paid a $525 fine. Three years later, he pled guilty to a federal charge for possession of several hundred marijuana plants. The marijuana conviction called for a mandatory minimum 10 years in prison. But for the misdemeanor llama conviction, defendant could have avoided the mandatory minimum by qualifying for the statutory safety valve, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), and his guideline sentencing range would have been 18 to 24 months in prison. Counting the llama conviction as one criminal history point, his second point, prevented use of the safety valve, which is limited to defendants with no more than one point. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence of 10 years, finding that the llama conviction is similar to misdemeanors listed in U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c) as offenses that should not count for any criminal history points. Application of that provision would have allowed the district court to reach the result that it felt was just here. . View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law

In this case the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request by Appellant, Terrie Sizemore, a veterinarian, for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board, to reissue a 2007 adjudication order finding her guilty of misconduct and imposing fines. Sizemore contended that the original order was not in compliance with Ohio Rev. Code 119.09, preventing her from pursuing an appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) because the Board dismissed the charges against Sizemore, the mandamus claim was moot; (2) the Board have any duty to reissue its prior adjudication order finding Sizemore guilty of misconduct; and (3) Sizemore had an adequate remedy by way of a motion for contempt to raise her claim that the board violated the court of appeals mandate to reissue its adjudication order. View "State ex rel. Sizemore v. Veterinary Med. Licensing Bd." on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. The Supreme Court held that (1) landlord can be the owner of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances, but any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (2) for that reason, the landlord in this case could not be liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

The patents involve topical compositions for protecting pets from fleas and ticks. The 940 patent, now expired, claimed fipronil for pest control by direct toxicity. Merial, as exclusive licensee, developed compositions sold as Frontline. Merial also devised compositions, covered by the 329 patent, combining fipronil with an insect growth regulator, sold as Frontline Plus, the leading flea and tick treatment. In 2007 Merial sued Cipla and other internet retailers, alleging infringement. No defendant responded. The district court found that the patents were not invalid, that Cipla had infringed each patent, and entered a permanent injunction barring Cipla from directly or indirectly infringing the patents. In 2008 Cipla filed an informal communication, not intended to constitute an appearance, denying infringing or having any presence in the U.S., and requesting dismissal. The district court entered final judgment. Velcera, led by former Merial executives, engaged with Cipla to develop, test, manufacture, and distribute products to compete with Merial. Both Velcera and Cipla entered into development and supply agreements with various companies. In 2011, they began selling PetArmor Plus. The district court held Velcera and Cipla in contempt. The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to jurisdiction and to the contempt order’s application to Velcera. View "Merial, Ltd. v. Cipla, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against officials who seized numerous dogs from a kennel she ran on her property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claims and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against the county under Heck v. Humphrey where plaintiff did not allege that her 163 convictions for animal cruelty had been overturned and plaintiff conceded that several of her allegations underlying such claims were past the statue of limitations. As for the 2006 claims, plaintiff failed to dispute the district court's holding that she failed to exhaust her remedy under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.2. Plaintiff also failed to show an unconstitutional policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation of her rights. The court further held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against the Humane Society defendants because no evidence supported plaintiff's conspiracy allegations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Van Buren County, et al." on Justia Law