Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

This interlocutory appeal arose from an action instituted in the district court to stop the government from rounding up, destroying, and auctioning off wild horses and burros in the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area on the California-Nevada border. Plaintiffs alleged that the government's actions would violate the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (Wild Horses Act), 16 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that the injunction was moot because the roundup sought to be enjoined had taken place. The court noted that, in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their claims, the district court should consider what relief was appropriate. View "In Defense of Animals, et al. v. US Dept. of the Interior, et al." on Justia Law

Rose Pray fell and was injured when a rottweiler broke loose from its owner and dashed across the street toward her. Pray brought an action for damages against the dog owner and the City. As against the City, Pray asserted that it knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that, under Tipton v. Town of Tabor, the city owed Pray no special duty and, therefore, owed no duty to control the conduct of third persons. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Pray needed to prove each of the four Tipton elements to establish that a special duty existed, but (2) as a matter of law, Pray did not meet the legal requirements to show such a duty. View "Pray v. City of Flandreau " on Justia Law

This case involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from two hunters (plaintiffs) who attempted to import the leopards from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim was barred from judicial review where plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures; plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission; and plaintiffs' choice to pursue such administrative remedies waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action. View "Conservation Force, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barry DuBois, an environmental officer, was seriously injured when he was bitten by a dog owned by defendant Frederick Quilitzsch while DuBois was inspecting a pigeon loft on defendant's property. DuBois and his wife filed a civil action against defendant, alleging strict liability, premises liability, and negligence. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the alleged attack occurred within the enclosure of the home and the defendants had no knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all three counts. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, and (2) any modification to the state's dog-bite law is best left to the legislature. View "DuBois v. Quilitzsch" on Justia Law

After sustaining serious injuries from an attack by a rottweiler, six-year-old Shawn Davis, through his mother as his next friend, filed a complaint against defendants Animal Control and the City of Evansville for failing to protect Davis from the attack. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that defendants were entitled to law enforcement immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The court of appeals reversed, and defendants sought transfer. At issue was whether defendants were enforcing a law under the ITCA or rather failing to follow their own procedures for determining whether an animal is dangerous. The Supreme Court held that the alleged failure of defendants to follow their procedures constituted at worst a failure to enforce a law, for which defendants were immune from liability under the ITCA. Judgment of the trial court affirmed. View "Davis ex rel. Davis v. Animal Control" on Justia Law

Petitioners Donna and Hilton Silver owned three horses found by police in terrible health. One horse had to be euthanized, and the other two were sent to a rescue farm for rehabilitation. The state charged the Silvers with three counts of animal cruelty. At a de novo trial in circuit court, the state pursued only the charge relating to the horse that died. At trial, the circuit court heard evidence regarding the condition of the other two horses and convicted the Silvers each of one count of animal cruelty. As a condition of probation, the court ordered the Silvers to pay restitution to the rescue farm. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was not permitted to order restitution for the other horses with regard to whom the defendants were not convicted of a crime and vacated that order. The Court affirmed the rest of the circuit court's judgments, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Silvers' motion to strike and instead granted them a short continuance and opportunity to examine belatedly delivered discovery documents; and (2) the lower court did not err in admitting photographs of the surviving horses. View "Silver v. State" on Justia Law

Fairfax County filed a petition in the general district court, seeking an order declaring Dolores Davis to be an unfit pet owner. The general district court entered the order, and Davis appealed to the circuit court. The county filed a motion to nonsuit the case, which the circuit court granted. The county then filed a new petition in the general district court. The general district court dismissed the petition on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, and the county appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court then entered an order declaring Davis to be an unfit pet owner, and Davis appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction. Davis appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. Because the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the general district court's jurisdiction, the Court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to decide the re-filed case on the merits after the general district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Davis v. County of Fairfax" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a trade association representing meatpackers and processors, sued to enjoin enforcement of a California law against swine slaughterhouses, arguing that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 601, et seq., preempted application of the law. The California law dictated what slaughterhouses must do with pigs that could not walk, known in the trade as nonambulatory pigs. The Court concluded that the FMIA regulated slaughterhouses' handling and treatment of nonambulatory pigs from the moment of their delivery through the end of the meat production process. California's law endeavored to regulate the same thing, at the same time, in the same place - except by imposing different requirements. The FMIA expressly preempted such a state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Meat Assn. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a trade association representing meatpackers and processors, sued to enjoin enforcement of a California law against swine slaughterhouses, arguing that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 601, et seq., preempted application of the law. The California law dictated what slaughterhouses must do with pigs that could not walk, known in the trade as nonambulatory pigs. The Court concluded that the FMIA regulated slaughterhouses' handling and treatment of nonambulatory pigs from the moment of their delivery through the end of the meat production process. California's law endeavored to regulate the same thing, at the same time, in the same place - except by imposing different requirements. The FMIA expressly preempted such a state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Meat Assn. v. Harris" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a trade association representing meatpackers and processors, sued to enjoin enforcement of a California law against swine slaughterhouses, arguing that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 601, et seq., preempted application of the law. The California law dictated what slaughterhouses must do with pigs that could not walk, known in the trade as nonambulatory pigs. The Court concluded that the FMIA regulated slaughterhouses' handling and treatment of nonambulatory pigs from the moment of their delivery through the end of the meat production process. California's law endeavored to regulate the same thing, at the same time, in the same place - except by imposing different requirements. The FMIA expressly preempted such a state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Meat Assn. v. Harris" on Justia Law