Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

After convicting seven defendants charged with operating a St. Louis area dog-fighting ring, the court sentenced all to a three-year term of supervised release and to payment of $100. Two defendants additionally received sentences of 16 and 18 months of incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the judge did not take on the role of a prosecutor and violate separation of powers by conducting independent research on dog fighting. The judge informed the parties of his research and carefully distinguished information in the memo from evidence related to the defendants. The court adequately justified the sentencing, finding the guidelines inadequate considering the number of dogs, dogs that had to be euthanized, the number of fights, extraordinary cruelty, and the leadership roles of the defendants.View "United States v. Courtland" on Justia Law

Wilgus was arrested for violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 668, which prohibits possession of eagle feathers, but excepts possession for religious purposes of Indian tribes. Wilgus is a follower of a Native American faith and blood-brother to a Paiute, but not a member of a recognized tribe, nor is he Indian by birth. He received at least one feather for religious purposes. Following a remand, the district court held that application of the Eagle Act to Wilgus would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 (RFRA), which prohibits government from substantially burdening religious freedom, except to forward a compelling governmental interest via the least restrictive means. The Tenth Circuit reversed. The government has competing compelling interests in protecting eagles and in preserving Native American religion and culture. The RFRA exception is intended to protect the religion and culture of tribes, not individual practitioners. Tribes are quasi-sovereign political entities; protection of faith practices among the general public might violate the Establishment Clause. The government need not refute every option to satisfy the least restrictive means prong of RFRA; the RFRA exception balances the competing interests. Proposed alternatives, involving creation of a feather repository, opening permits to all sincere adherents to Native American religion, or allowing Native Americans to gift feathers, would either be impractical or have a negative impact on governmental goals.View "United States v. Wilgus" on Justia Law

Respondent Jill Engquist, as parent and natural guardian of minor Amber Engquist, sued Appellants, Steven and Christina Loyas, for injuries Amber sustained as a result of a dog bite that occurred at Appellants' residence. The district court entered judgment in favor of Appellants after finding that Amber provoked the dog to bite her. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the jury instruction given by the district court misstated the meaning of provocation under Minn. Stat. 347.22. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the jury could have found provocation without any consideration of the victim's knowledge of the danger, the jury instructions materially misstated the law and prejudiced Respondent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Engquist v. Loyas" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Romero appealed his three year sentence for aggravated animal cruelty. In 2009, Defendant tied a rope around the neck of "Buddy," a dog belonging to a family in Delta, Colorado, and dragged him to death behind a pick-up truck on federal land. The United States Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence investigation report (PSR), indicating that while Defendant was in jail for killing Buddy and before pleading guilty, he made a series of telephone calls attempting to silence witnesses and procure false grand jury testimony. The PSR recounted Romero’s ten prior felony convictions, poor physical health, mild mental retardation, amphetamine dependence, depression, and “[i]ntermittent [e]xplosive [d]isorder." The presumptive sentence for aggravated animal cruelty was 12-18 months, but that maximum could be doubled under certain circumstances. Upon review of the sentencing court's record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence when sentencing Defendant to 36-months' imprisonment. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "United States v. Romero" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from an action instituted in the district court to stop the government from rounding up, destroying, and auctioning off wild horses and burros in the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area on the California-Nevada border. Plaintiffs alleged that the government's actions would violate the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (Wild Horses Act), 16 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that the injunction was moot because the roundup sought to be enjoined had taken place. The court noted that, in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their claims, the district court should consider what relief was appropriate. View "In Defense of Animals, et al. v. US Dept. of the Interior, et al." on Justia Law

Rose Pray fell and was injured when a rottweiler broke loose from its owner and dashed across the street toward her. Pray brought an action for damages against the dog owner and the City. As against the City, Pray asserted that it knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that, under Tipton v. Town of Tabor, the city owed Pray no special duty and, therefore, owed no duty to control the conduct of third persons. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Pray needed to prove each of the four Tipton elements to establish that a special duty existed, but (2) as a matter of law, Pray did not meet the legal requirements to show such a duty. View "Pray v. City of Flandreau " on Justia Law

This case involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from two hunters (plaintiffs) who attempted to import the leopards from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim was barred from judicial review where plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures; plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission; and plaintiffs' choice to pursue such administrative remedies waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action. View "Conservation Force, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Barry DuBois, an environmental officer, was seriously injured when he was bitten by a dog owned by defendant Frederick Quilitzsch while DuBois was inspecting a pigeon loft on defendant's property. DuBois and his wife filed a civil action against defendant, alleging strict liability, premises liability, and negligence. After discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the alleged attack occurred within the enclosure of the home and the defendants had no knowledge of the dog's vicious propensity, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all three counts. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to defendants' knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities, and (2) any modification to the state's dog-bite law is best left to the legislature. View "DuBois v. Quilitzsch" on Justia Law

After sustaining serious injuries from an attack by a rottweiler, six-year-old Shawn Davis, through his mother as his next friend, filed a complaint against defendants Animal Control and the City of Evansville for failing to protect Davis from the attack. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that defendants were entitled to law enforcement immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The court of appeals reversed, and defendants sought transfer. At issue was whether defendants were enforcing a law under the ITCA or rather failing to follow their own procedures for determining whether an animal is dangerous. The Supreme Court held that the alleged failure of defendants to follow their procedures constituted at worst a failure to enforce a law, for which defendants were immune from liability under the ITCA. Judgment of the trial court affirmed. View "Davis ex rel. Davis v. Animal Control" on Justia Law

Petitioners Donna and Hilton Silver owned three horses found by police in terrible health. One horse had to be euthanized, and the other two were sent to a rescue farm for rehabilitation. The state charged the Silvers with three counts of animal cruelty. At a de novo trial in circuit court, the state pursued only the charge relating to the horse that died. At trial, the circuit court heard evidence regarding the condition of the other two horses and convicted the Silvers each of one count of animal cruelty. As a condition of probation, the court ordered the Silvers to pay restitution to the rescue farm. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was not permitted to order restitution for the other horses with regard to whom the defendants were not convicted of a crime and vacated that order. The Court affirmed the rest of the circuit court's judgments, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Silvers' motion to strike and instead granted them a short continuance and opportunity to examine belatedly delivered discovery documents; and (2) the lower court did not err in admitting photographs of the surviving horses. View "Silver v. State" on Justia Law