Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Humane officers from the Humane Society of the Sierra Foothills seized animals from Matthew C. Bakos's property under a search warrant issued pursuant to Penal Code section 597.1. Bakos subsequently sued the officers and a volunteer veterinarian, alleging negligence and abuse of process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that although the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity due to the lack of a postseizure administrative hearing, Bakos could not establish essential elements of his causes of action.The Superior Court of Placer County found that Bakos could not prove negligence because he could not establish a duty of care or breach of duty owed to him. The court also concluded that Bakos could not establish negligence per se because he was not a member of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted, and the harm he suffered was not the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found no evidence that any defendant harbored an ulterior motive. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that summary judgment was proper as to the veterinarian, Fritz, and summary adjudication was proper as to all defendants on the abuse of process cause of action. However, the court found that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the negligence cause of action against the Humane Society, Roach, and Frieborn because Bakos was not afforded the opportunity for a postseizure administrative hearing, and the defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. The appellate court reversed the judgment as to the negligence cause of action against the Humane Society, Roach, and Frieborn, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "Bakos v. Roach" on Justia Law

Five elderly African elephants, Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo, reside at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo. The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NRP) filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of the elephants, seeking their transfer to a suitable elephant sanctuary. NRP argued that the elephants were unlawfully confined and had a right to bodily liberty due to their cognitive and social complexities. The petition included affidavits from animal biologists supporting the elephants' autonomy and complex needs.The El Paso County District Court dismissed the petition, ruling that Colorado's habeas corpus statute only applies to persons, not nonhuman animals. The court accepted NRP's allegations as true but concluded that the elephants lacked standing to seek habeas relief. The court also determined that NRP did not have proper next friend status to bring the petition on the elephants' behalf. Additionally, the court found that NRP failed to make a prima facie case that the elephants were unlawfully confined, as the zoo was operating within legal standards.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the habeas corpus statute in Colorado applies only to persons, defined as human beings, and does not extend to nonhuman animals. The court rejected NRP's argument to rely on common law for broader habeas corpus rights, emphasizing that the statute explicitly limits relief to persons. The court also noted that recognizing nonhuman animals as persons would have significant legal and societal implications. Consequently, the elephants did not have standing to bring a habeas corpus claim, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y" on Justia Law

Benjamin Benfer and his wife were pulled over by Officer Barry Calvert for allegedly running a red light and because their vehicle matched the description of a stolen car. A confrontation ensued, during which Calvert used his K-9 to subdue Benfer. Both Benfer and his wife were arrested and charged with resisting arrest and interference with public duties, but the charges were later dismissed.Benfer filed a lawsuit against Calvert and the City of Baytown under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, claiming violations of his constitutional rights and state tort claims. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case, ruling that Calvert did not violate Benfer’s constitutional rights, that Benfer’s state tort claims were not valid under Texas law, and that Benfer did not provide sufficient facts to support his claims against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Calvert had reasonable suspicion to stop Benfer, probable cause to arrest him for resisting arrest, and did not use excessive force in deploying his K-9. The court also found that Benfer’s state law assault claim against Calvert was barred by the Texas Tort Claims Act, which requires such claims to be brought against the municipality, not the individual officer. Additionally, the court ruled that Benfer failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claims against the City of Baytown for inadequate policies, failure to train, and ratification of Calvert’s conduct. View "Benfer v. City of Baytown" on Justia Law

The case involves the Schrivers, who sought damages after their cat, Gypsy, died following a veterinary procedure and was subjected to an unauthorized necropsy by Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore Animal Hospital. The Schrivers claimed non-economic damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship, arguing that the emotional bond between pet and owner should be compensable. They also sought economic damages based on the pet's value to them.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore on several claims, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court denied the Schrivers' claim for emotional distress damages related to trespass to chattels/conversion but allowed the "value to owner" measure of economic damages for the loss of Gypsy.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the denial of emotional distress damages for trespass to chattels/conversion, agreeing that such damages are limited to independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, holding that veterinarians do not have a duty to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related to the unauthorized necropsy, finding that a jury should decide if the conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court affirmed the use of the "value to owner" measure of damages, excluding sentimental value.The case was remanded for further proceedings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Schrivers were awarded costs on appeal, but attorney fees were not granted to Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore, as the primary issue of liability remains unresolved. View "Schriver v. Raptosh" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was bitten by a dog at a facility operated by an animal welfare organization. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the organization, invoking Delaware's "dog bite statute," which imposes strict liability on a dog owner for any injury caused by the dog. The Superior Court of Delaware granted summary judgment in favor of the organization, ruling that the statute does not apply to animal welfare organizations. The court reasoned that the statute was intended to target irresponsible dog owners who keep vicious dogs as pets, not organizations like the defendant.The Superior Court's decision was based on its interpretation of the legislative intent behind the dog bite statute. The court also held that the plaintiff could not establish negligence on the part of the organization without expert testimony, as the standard of care applicable to animal shelters was outside the common knowledge of laypersons.The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the dog bite statute. It found that the statute unambiguously imposes strict liability on any person who owns, keeps, harbors, or is the custodian of a dog, without any exception for animal welfare organizations. The court also disagreed with the lower court's requirement for expert testimony to establish negligence, ruling that the standard of care in handling a domestic animal with known vicious propensities is within the common knowledge of laypersons. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc." on Justia Law

Sylvan Plowright filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County, its police chief, and two of its police officers after one of the officers, Sergio Cordova, fatally shot Plowright’s dog, Niles, during an investigation. The district court dismissed Plowright’s complaint, concluding that Cordova was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate any clearly established right when he shot Niles.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the use of deadly force against a domestic animal constitutes a seizure of its owner’s property subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. The court found that under the facts alleged in the complaint, no reasonable officer in Cordova’s position could have believed that Niles posed an imminent danger, and therefore, his decision to shoot Niles falls short of that requirement. The court reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s § 1983 claim against Cordova and remanded for further proceedings. The court also reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cordova. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plowright’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a second officer, as well as his claims against the county and its police chief. View "Plowright v. Miami Dade County" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the ownership of a purebred show dog named Oscar. The parties involved are Oscar's breeder, Elizabeth "Betsy" Shauck, and Dave Jennings and Emily McLeod, who have raised Oscar since he was a puppy. Dave and Emily filed a petition to quiet title to Oscar against Betsy, who counterclaimed for breach of contract, replevin, conversion, for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, and to quiet title. Betsy's preliminary injunction counterclaim asked the district court to prevent Dave and Emily from harboring Oscar and to order his immediate return to her.The district court held a three-day hearing, which was supposed to be on Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction. However, the court expanded the scope of the hearing and made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of all issues pending in the underlying lawsuit, including Oscar's ownership, contract disputes, and damages. Dave and Emily appealed this decision, arguing that the district court denied their due process rights by deciding the case on the merits when it had only set the hearing on Betsy's preliminary injunction.The Kansas Court of Appeals panel held that the district court violated Dave and Emily's due process rights by expanding the scope of the hearing without notice. However, instead of remanding the case, the panel analyzed the parties' ownership interests in Oscar and held that Dave and Betsy co-owned Oscar. Betsy then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the panel. The court agreed with the panel that the district court erred by expanding the scope of the hearing on Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the district court's decision to consolidate the hearing on Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the case's merits without informing the parties was a denial of due process and an error of law. The court also agreed with the panel's conclusion that the district court's failure prejudiced Dave and Emily. However, the court held that the panel erred by addressing the case's merits after correctly concluding that the district court erred. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jennings v. Shauck" on Justia Law

The case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit involved Allen Thomas Bloodworth, II, a business owner who operated two towing businesses in Kansas City. Bloodworth alleged that the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners and fourteen officers of the Kansas City Police Department conspired to stop him from running his businesses and shut down his ability to conduct business in Kansas City. He brought 17 state and federal claims, including defamation, tortious interference with contract and business expectancy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, training, supervision, or retention. He also alleged Fourth Amendment violations for an unlawful warrant search and seizure of his residence and business, the shooting of his dog during the search, and the seizure of business records.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling. The appellate court concluded that Bloodworth failed to link the specific conduct of individual defendants to the alleged constitutional violations, and his claims were based on general assertions mostly. It also ruled that Bloodworth failed to establish that the defendants' conduct was extreme and outrageous to support his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court further found that Bloodworth failed to establish a constitutional violation resulting from the official policy, unlawful practice, custom, or failure to properly train, retain, supervise, or discipline the police officers. Therefore, there was no basis for municipal liability against the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners. View "Bloodworth v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners" on Justia Law

The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“ASPCA”) appealed the judgment of the district court dismissing its “policy or practice” claim brought under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) against the Department of Agriculture and its component agency, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. The ASPCA alleged that the agencies adopted a policy or practice of violating the FOIA when the agencies decommissioned two online databases of frequently requested documents. The ASPCA argued that the policy or practice violates the FOIA. While the ASPCA’s action was pending before the district court, Congress enacted a new statute that required the agencies to recommission the databases, and the agencies complied. The district court held that the ASPCA’s policy or practice claim was resolved when the agencies recommissioned the databases as required by law.   The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the ASPCA cannot state a policy or practice claim that the agencies systematically violated the FOIA after an intervening statutory enactment required the restoration of the databases that underpinned the ASPCA’s claim. The court explained that even assuming that a “policy or practice” claim is cognizable, the ASPCA failed to state such a claim against the agencies because the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020 reversed the alleged policy or practice. View "ASPCA v. APHIS & Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

Several dog owners sued the City of Council Bluffs challenging the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting “pit bulls" under 42 Sec. 1983. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, finding that the ordinance had the "required rational relationship to the health, safety, and public welfare interests of the city to survive rational basis review." The dog owners appealed the trial court's ruling pertaining to their equal protection and substantive due process claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first noted that the parties agreed that rational-basis review was appropriate. However, the dog owners claimed that their evidence "negates every conceivable basis for the Ordinance’s rational relationship," presenting expert testimony that showed, among other things, pitbulls were not any more dangerous than other breeds of dogs that were permitted under the ordinance. ultimately, the court concluded that the City had a conceivable basis to believe banning pit bulls would promote the health and safety of Council Bluff citizens. View "Rachael Danker v. The City of Council Bluffs" on Justia Law