Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Big Cats of Serenity Springs was a Colorado-based non-profit that provided housing, food, and veterinary care for exotic animals. The facility was regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Three APHIS inspectors accompanied by sheriff’s deputies broke into the Big Cats facility without its permission to perform an unannounced inspection of two tiger cubs. But at the time the inspectors entered the facility, the cubs were at a veterinarian’s office receiving treatment, just as Big Cats had promised the APHIS inspectors the previous day. Big Cats and its directors sued the APHIS inspectors for the unauthorized entry pursuant to "Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents," (403 U.S. 388 (1971)) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting the entry was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the APHIS inspectors’ motion to dismiss the complaint and they filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the court’s failure to grant qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Big Cats’ complaint stated a claim for relief under "Bivens." No APHIS inspector would reasonably have believed unauthorized forcible entry of the Big Cats facility was permissible, and therefore Big Cats and its directors could have a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. But the Court reversed on Big Cats’ civil rights claim because the federal inspectors were not liable under section 1983 in the circumstances here. View "Big Cats of Serenity Springs v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Neita formerly owned and operated a dog-grooming business and rescue shelter. In 2012, he went to Chicago’s Department of Animal Care and Control to surrender a dog that had killed another dog and a dog that had become ill after whelping puppies. Travis, an Animal Control employee, called the police. Officers arrested and searched Neita, then searched his vehicle, and his business premises. Neita was charged with animal cruelty and 13 counts of violating an animal owner’s duties under Illinois law. He was found not guilty on all counts. After his acquittal, Neita suedTravis, the officers, and the city. The judge dismissed the federal claims, holding that Neita not adequately pled any constitutional violation and relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the complaint’s allegations sufficient to state 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims for false arrest and illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Neita alleged that he surrendered two dogs, neither of which showed signs of abuse or neglect, and was arrested without any evidence that he had mistreated either dog. If these allegations are true, no reasonable person would have cause to believe that Neita had abused or neglected an animal. View "Neita v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, walking her brown labrador retriever, “Dog,” encountered a gray and white pit bull running loose, which lunged at Dog’s neck. The dogs began to fight. Neighbors unsuccessfully tried to separate them. Plaintiff dropped Dog’s leash so that Dog could defend himself. Officer Davis, driving to a burglary call, received a report that a pit bull was attacking another dog at a corner along his route. Davis pulled over and trained his spotlight on the dogs. Plaintiff, who was crying, identified herself and described Dog. Davis has a form of colorblindness that makes it difficult for him to distinguish certain colors, but had not informed his employer of his condition. Davis shot at what he thought was the aggressor. The dogs separated. Dog limped toward plaintiff, who cried that Davis had shot her dog. Davis then aimed at the pit bull and fired several times. The pit bull left the scene. Dog died as a result of the gunshot wound. From the time Davis had arrived until the time he fired his seventh shot, about two minutes elapsed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of Davis in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unconstitutional seizure of Dog. The court upheld a conclusion that Davis had not committed discovery violations and the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ proffered Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis jury instruction. View "Saathoff v. Davis" on Justia Law

Municipalities City of Spencer and the Town of Forest Park, and Blaze’s Tribute Equine Rescue, acting under a search warrant, seized 44 abused and neglected horses from plaintiff-appellant Ann Campbell’s properties. After a forfeiture hearing, a state district court in Oklahoma issued an order granting Spencer and Forest Park’s joint forfeiture petition. Campbell later sued the municipalities (and Blaze) in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court dismissed Campbell’s complaint, applying both claim and issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of matters common to the state court forfeiture proceeding. Campbell appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly dismissed Campbell’s 1983 claims: because Campbell could have raised her constitutional claims in the forfeiture proceeding but did not do so, and because the Court's allowing her to raise these claims in this appeal would impair the Municipalities’ rights established in that proceeding, the Court held that the district court properly concluded that claim preclusion disallowed Campbell from pursuing her constitutional claims. View "Campbell v. City of Spencer" on Justia Law

McKamey, a private non-profit corporation that contracted with Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare services, received complaints about conditions at United pet store. McKamey employees Walsh and Nicholson discovered animals without water, and with no working air conditioning. Aided by Hurn, they removed animals and business records from the store and proceeded to revoke its pet-dealer permit. United filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the city; McKamey; and the employees, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that removal of its animals and revocation of its permit without a prior hearing violated procedural due process and that the warrantless seizures violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held that Hurn, acting as a private animal-welfare officer, may not assert qualified immunity as a defense in the personal capacity suit. Walsh and Nicholson, however, acted as both private animal-welfare officers and specially-commissioned city police officers; they are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on the procedural due-process claims based on the seizure of the animals and of the permit. Regarding the Fourth Amendment claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on claims based on the seizure of the animals. Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on seizure of the business records. Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of business records. Qualified immunity is not an available defense to an official-capacity suit. View "United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Association under the Federal and Florida Fair Housing Acts (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(b) and Fla. Stat. 760.23(9)(b). Plaintiff alleged that the Association violated these statutes when it enforced its pet weight policy and demanded that plaintiff remove his emotional support dog from his condominium. The jury awarded plaintiff damages and the district court awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees. The Association appealed. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on the refusal-to-accommodate element; plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show he has a disability within the meaning of the FHA; plaintiff produced evidence supporting the conclusion that the requested accommodation was necessary; the jury instructions do not warrant reversal; in allowing the dog to remain in the courtroom, the district court did not abuse its discretion; and the district court did not err in awarding attorneys' fees. Because there was no merit to any of the arguments the Association made on appeal, the court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's order. View "Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo Assoc." on Justia Law

Petkus owns a property that she operated as an animal sanctuary until 2009, when an investigation by the ASPCA resulted in a search of her property, termination of her employment as Richland County dogcatcher, her arrest and prosecution for animal neglect, and a sentence to three years of probation. As authorized by Wis. Stat. 173.10, the ASPCA investigator procured a warrant to search Petkus’s property. The warrant directed law enforcement officers to enlist in the search veterinarians or any “other persons or agencies authorized by the Richland County District Attorney.” The veterinary and 40-50 animal-rights volunteers who accompanied deputy sheriffs conducted the search. They had not been deputized. The deputy sheriffs’ role was not to participate in the search but simply to “keep the peace.” Petkus sued, alleging negligence in failing to train or supervise the amateur searchers and that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Petkus won an award of damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting needless damage to Petkus’s property and that the “incompetence of the amateur searchers is apparent from the reports of the deputy sheriffs.” View "Petkus v. Richland Cnty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, committed animal rights activists, filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“Act”), which criminalizes “force, violence, and threats involving animal enterprises,” violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs had never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the Act but claimed that fear of future prosecution and present self-restraint caused them to suffer injury in fact. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish an injury in fact as required by Article III. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated and speculative fear of prosecution under the Act was not a basis for standing under U.S. Const. art. III. View "Blum v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foie gras producers and sellers, appealed the district court's denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of California from enforcing California Health & Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 banned the sale of products that were the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. The court dismissed the State of California and Governor Brown from the lawsuit because they were immune from suit. The court concluded that the only product covered by section 25982 at issue in this appeal was foie gras; plaintiffs' Due Process Clause challenge failed because section 25982's definition for force feeding was not vague and the statute gave fair notice of prohibited conduct; and section 25982 did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not discriminatory, did not directly regulate interstate commerce, and did not substantially burden interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to raise a serious question that they were likely to succeed on the merits. View "Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards v. Harris" on Justia Law

This case arose out of three biting incidents involving a dog owned by Respondent. After the first bite, the City of Lino Lakes designated Respondent's dog as "potentially dangerous," and after the second bite, the City designated the dog as "dangerous." After the third bite, the City ordered the dog to be destroyed. The court of appeals reversed the City's decisions, holding that Appellant's inability to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation violated his right to procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upheld the City's designation of the dog as "dangerous," and affirmed the City's order to destroy the dog, holding (1) Respondent was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation; and (2) substantial evidence supported the City's decisions. View "Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes" on Justia Law