Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Belinda Fitzpatrick owns two adjacent homes in Lansing, Michigan. In September 2021, Ingham County Animal Control received a complaint about Fitzpatrick harboring up to 30 chickens in unsanitary conditions. Officer Kyle Hanney from Animal Control investigated and observed severe unsanitary conditions, including a strong odor of ammonia and chicken feces throughout the house. Hanney obtained a warrant to search both homes for evidence of animal neglect and cruelty. He invited Matthew Simon, a local housing-code official, to join the search. Simon concluded that both homes were unfit for human occupancy and placed red tags on them, prohibiting entry until cleaned.Fitzpatrick sued Officer Hanney, Simon, and the City of Lansing, alleging violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Simon moved to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denied Simon’s motion, concluding that Simon had plausibly violated Fitzpatrick’s clearly established constitutional rights. Simon then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Simon was entitled to qualified immunity on Fitzpatrick’s Fourth Amendment claims because it was not clearly established that Simon needed a separate warrant for housing-code violations when he was searching for the same conditions as authorized by Hanney’s warrant. The court also held that Simon was entitled to qualified immunity on Fitzpatrick’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, as the unsanitary conditions in her homes constituted exigent circumstances justifying immediate eviction without prior notice. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the claims against Simon. View "Fitzpatrick v. Hanney" on Justia Law

Marc A. Lesperance was found with his dog off-leash in Baxter Woods, Portland, despite a city ordinance requiring dogs to be leashed from April 1 to July 31. A park ranger informed Lesperance of the rule, but Lesperance refused to comply. The ranger, after consulting with a colleague, issued a summons and complaint. The District Court (Portland) fined Lesperance $500, noting it was not his first violation of the ordinance.Lesperance appealed, arguing that the park ranger was not authorized to issue the summons and complaint. He also claimed the city ordinance was preempted by state law and unconstitutionally vague. The court found these arguments without merit, stating the ordinance was clear and not preempted by state law.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court considered whether the park ranger, appointed as a constable, needed to meet specific training requirements to enforce the ordinance. The Attorney General, representing the Maine Criminal Justice Academy, suggested that constables might require less rigorous training than law enforcement officers. The court applied the "de facto officer" doctrine, concluding that Lesperance could not challenge the ranger's authority based on potential training deficiencies. The court affirmed the judgment, validating the ranger's actions as those of a de facto officer. View "City of Portland v. Lesperance" on Justia Law

Mary Mercedes was accused of animal cruelty based on evidence obtained during a warrantless search of her property. Officers visited her property multiple times after receiving complaints about the condition of her animals. During these visits, Mercedes allowed the officers to view the animals, and based on their observations, a search warrant was later issued. The officers then seized the animals, and Mercedes was charged with two counts of animal cruelty.The trial court granted Mercedes's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the property visits, ruling that the officers' consent to enter was invalid without providing Ferrier warnings, which inform individuals of their right to refuse, limit, and revoke consent. The trial court dismissed the charges due to lack of probable cause. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Ferrier warnings were not required for the search of Mercedes's outdoor property and remanded the case to determine if her consent was voluntary.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Ferrier warnings are required only when officers seek to enter a person's home to conduct a warrantless search for evidence of a crime. Since the officers' visits to Mercedes's property were for investigative purposes and did not involve entering her home, Ferrier warnings were not necessary. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if Mercedes's consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. View "State v. Mercedes" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are retail pet stores, a dog broker, and a dog breeder who want to sell dogs through physical retail stores in Maryland. However, a Maryland law restricts their ability to do so. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the Maryland statute is preempted by the federal Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they failed to state plausible claims. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the AWA does not preempt the Maryland statute because the AWA expressly contemplates state and local regulation on the same subject. The court also found that the Maryland statute does not pose an impermissible obstacle to achieving the purposes and objectives of the AWA.Regarding the Commerce Clause claims, the court held that the Maryland statute does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect. The statute applies equally to in-state and out-of-state breeders and brokers, and it does not prohibit the flow of interstate goods or place added costs upon them. The court also found that the statute does not violate the Pike balancing test because the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that the statute imposes a substantial burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, holding that the Maryland statute is not preempted by the AWA and does not violate the Commerce Clause. View "Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Dr. Ronald S. Hines, a retired and physically disabled veterinarian licensed in Texas, provided online pet-care advice without physically examining the animals. Texas law requires veterinarians to establish a veterinarian-client-patient relationship (VCPR) through an in-person examination or a visit to the premises where the animal is kept before offering veterinary advice. Dr. Hines was penalized for violating this requirement, receiving probation, a fine, and being forced to retake a licensing exam. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, arguing that it unconstitutionally restricted his speech.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas initially dismissed Dr. Hines's First Amendment claim, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for further consideration in light of new Supreme Court precedent. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the law regulated Dr. Hines's speech in a content-neutral way and survived intermediate scrutiny. Dr. Hines appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the physical-examination requirement primarily regulated Dr. Hines's speech rather than his conduct. The court found that the State failed to demonstrate that the harms it sought to address with the law were real and that the law alleviated these harms in a direct and material way. The court also concluded that the law was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests, as it burdened substantially more speech than necessary. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for Dr. Hines, upholding his First Amendment rights. View "Hines v. Pardue" on Justia Law

A resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States precludes the application of a federal cockfighting prohibition. The plaintiff also sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of this prohibition. The federal cockfighting prohibition, codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and amended in 2018, made cockfighting illegal in all U.S. jurisdictions, including the CNMI.The U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the federal cockfighting prohibition applied to the CNMI under the Covenant. The district court determined that 7 U.S.C. § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as required by Covenant § 502, and thus also applicable to the CNMI. The court also found that Covenant § 105, which governs laws enacted after January 9, 1978, did not apply to amendments of laws that existed on that date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Covenant § 502 governs the applicability of 7 U.S.C. § 2156 and its 2018 Amendment to the CNMI. The court found that § 2156 was applicable to Guam and the several states as of January 9, 1978, and thus applicable to the CNMI. The court also held that even if Covenant § 105 were to govern, the federal cockfighting prohibition would still apply to the CNMI because it is applicable to the several states and does not impermissibly intrude upon the internal affairs of the CNMI. The court concluded that the federal interests in regulating interstate commerce, ensuring the humane treatment of animals, and preventing the spread of avian flu outweighed any intrusion into the CNMI’s internal affairs. The judgment was affirmed. View "SALAS V. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott Johnson, Harlene Hoyt, and Covey Find Kennel, LLC, who challenged the constitutionality of a Kansas statute that allows warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business that houses and trains bird dogs. They also claimed that their constitutional right to travel was infringed by a statutory requirement that they make the premises available for inspection within 30 minutes of the arrival of an inspector. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their right-to-travel claim but remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Mr. Johnson’s business is closely regulated and, if so, whether warrantless inspections are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the boarding or training kennel industry was not clearly closely regulated, and the government had not shown that warrantless searches were necessary. The court also held that the regulations did not impose burdens beyond those commonly borne by owners of businesses who travel away from the locations of their businesses, and thus did not violate the plaintiffs' right to travel. View "Johnson v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves the Alaska Trappers Association and the National Trappers Association (collectively, the Trappers) who challenged a city ordinance enacted by the City of Valdez. The ordinance regulated animal trapping within the city limits, barring trapping in certain areas for the purpose of protecting public safety and domesticated animals. The Trappers argued that the ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional, asserting that it was preempted by state law and violated the Alaska Constitution.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Valdez, granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Valdez. The court concluded that the legislature's delegation of authority to the Board of Game was limited and did not grant the Board exclusive control of trapping. The court also determined that the ordinance did not directly contradict state regulations.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not prohibited by the Alaska Constitution or the legislature’s delegation of authority over fish and game to the Board. The court concluded that the ordinance was not impliedly prohibited by state law, as it was enacted pursuant to Valdez's authority to regulate land use and public safety, and was not substantially irreconcilable with the State's authority to regulate the conservation, development, or utilization of game. View "Alaska Trappers Association, Inc. v. City of Valdez" on Justia Law

Petitioner Denver Lee Shoop kept a small herd of eight bison on his property. The State charged him with eight counts of animal cruelty in the first degree for his treatment of those eight bison. RCW 16.52.205(2) stated that one commits “animal cruelty in the first degree” when “he or she, with criminal negligence, starves, dehydrates, or suffocates an animal…” and causes considerably suffering or death. The State included “starves, dehydrates, or suffocates” in each of the eight counts. The jury convicted Shoop as charged, but without specifying which of those three means the State actually proved. Shoop appealed, arguing in part that RCW 16.52.205(2) constituted an “alternative means” crime, so either (1) the jury had to achieve unanimity about which means the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt or (2) the record had to show that sufficient evidence supported each of those multiple means. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 16.52.205(2) described a single crime of animal cruelty in the first degree. “That statutory subsection’s list of ways of committing animal cruelty—negligently starving, dehydrating, or suffocating—constitute “minor nuances inhering in the same act [or omission],” not completely different acts, i.e., not “alternative means.” View "Washington v. Shoop" on Justia Law

Defendant David Tufano was convicted by jury for misdemeanor cruelty to animals. In 2019, Richard Roberge was working in his yard at his home in Somersworth. He heard a low, loud moaning noise coming from the defendant’s home across the street and went over to investigate. He saw the defendant with a hose in his hand spraying water into a plastic container. Inside the container was a “Havahart Trap” with a cat in it. He told the defendant to take the trap out of the bucket and open the trap, which the defendant did. The cat then ran off. Roberge did not immediately report the incident to police, but did so later, after other neighbors told him he should. Specifically, after his neighbor Sharon Barry told him about a prior incident in which defendant had placed a trap on his property, Roberge decided to contact the police. At trial, defendant objected to the trial court’s admission of any of Barry’s statements made about his cat trapping. Defendant also filed a motion in limine to allow him to impeach Barry with a prior conviction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was an abuse of discretion. “While it was undisputed that the defendant sprayed the trapped cat inside a container, we cannot say that those facts alone ‘clearly constitute mistreatment of the cat that grossly deviates from what a reasonable person would do in the same situation.’” Because the erroneously-admitted evidence of prior cat trapping could have influenced the jury to view the defendant as a person who was “hostile toward cats” and likely to abuse or mistreat one, it could have led the jury to credit Roberge’s testimony over the defendant’s and to convict him of the charged offense. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Hampshire v. Tufano" on Justia Law