Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

McKamey, a private non-profit corporation that contracted with Chattanooga to provide animal-welfare services, received complaints about conditions at United pet store. McKamey employees Walsh and Nicholson discovered animals without water, and with no working air conditioning. Aided by Hurn, they removed animals and business records from the store and proceeded to revoke its pet-dealer permit. United filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the city; McKamey; and the employees, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that removal of its animals and revocation of its permit without a prior hearing violated procedural due process and that the warrantless seizures violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit held that Hurn, acting as a private animal-welfare officer, may not assert qualified immunity as a defense in the personal capacity suit. Walsh and Nicholson, however, acted as both private animal-welfare officers and specially-commissioned city police officers; they are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on the procedural due-process claims based on the seizure of the animals and of the permit. Regarding the Fourth Amendment claims: Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to summary judgment of qualified immunity on claims based on the seizure of the animals. Nicholson is entitled to summary judgment on the claim based on seizure of the business records. Walsh is denied summary judgment on the claim based on the seizure of business records. Qualified immunity is not an available defense to an official-capacity suit. View "United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Association under the Federal and Florida Fair Housing Acts (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(b) and Fla. Stat. 760.23(9)(b). Plaintiff alleged that the Association violated these statutes when it enforced its pet weight policy and demanded that plaintiff remove his emotional support dog from his condominium. The jury awarded plaintiff damages and the district court awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees. The Association appealed. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on the refusal-to-accommodate element; plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to show he has a disability within the meaning of the FHA; plaintiff produced evidence supporting the conclusion that the requested accommodation was necessary; the jury instructions do not warrant reversal; in allowing the dog to remain in the courtroom, the district court did not abuse its discretion; and the district court did not err in awarding attorneys' fees. Because there was no merit to any of the arguments the Association made on appeal, the court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's order. View "Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo Assoc." on Justia Law

Petkus owns a property that she operated as an animal sanctuary until 2009, when an investigation by the ASPCA resulted in a search of her property, termination of her employment as Richland County dogcatcher, her arrest and prosecution for animal neglect, and a sentence to three years of probation. As authorized by Wis. Stat. 173.10, the ASPCA investigator procured a warrant to search Petkus’s property. The warrant directed law enforcement officers to enlist in the search veterinarians or any “other persons or agencies authorized by the Richland County District Attorney.” The veterinary and 40-50 animal-rights volunteers who accompanied deputy sheriffs conducted the search. They had not been deputized. The deputy sheriffs’ role was not to participate in the search but simply to “keep the peace.” Petkus sued, alleging negligence in failing to train or supervise the amateur searchers and that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Petkus won an award of damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting needless damage to Petkus’s property and that the “incompetence of the amateur searchers is apparent from the reports of the deputy sheriffs.” View "Petkus v. Richland Cnty" on Justia Law

Codefendants Fessenden and Dicke jointly owned a horse, which they kept on Dicke’s property. Dicke’s neighbors called the sheriff’s office to report that the horse appeared to be starving. An officer with specialized training in animal husbandry and in investigating animal cruelty was dispatched to investigate. In consolidated criminal appeals, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the officer violated Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when, without a warrant, he entered private property, seized the horse, and took the horse to a veterinarian. The Court concluded that the officer acted lawfully because he had probable cause to believe that defendants were committing the crime of animal neglect and reasonably believed, based on specific articulable facts, that immediate action was necessary to prevent further imminent harm to and the death of the horse. The Court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals. View "Oregon v. Fessenden" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Deskins challenged the sentence she received after a jury found her guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the cruelty to animals statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited her from owning or living with animals as a condition of probation; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to forfeit any remaining animals to the Stevens County Sheriffs Office after giving her seven days to find them new homes; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding to sentencing 22 minutes after the verdict and imposing restitution to reimburse the county for animal care. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture challenge was moot, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all other issues. View "Washington v. Deskins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, committed animal rights activists, filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“Act”), which criminalizes “force, violence, and threats involving animal enterprises,” violates the First Amendment. Plaintiffs had never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the Act but claimed that fear of future prosecution and present self-restraint caused them to suffer injury in fact. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish an injury in fact as required by Article III. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated and speculative fear of prosecution under the Act was not a basis for standing under U.S. Const. art. III. View "Blum v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2011, an Ohio man released more than 50 exotic animals before committing suicide. Partially in response, the state enacted the Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, Ohio Rev. Code 935.01–935.99. All persons in possession of dangerous wild animals before September 5, 2012, were required to register with the Ohio Department of Agriculture and to microchip each registered animal upon registration. The Act prohibits possession of a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014. A person already in possession of a dangerous wild animal and wishing to continue to possess the animal after that date may obtain a wildlife shelter permit or a wildlife propagation permit. Owners of exotic animals challenged the Act as violating First Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech, arguing that the permitting requirements are so onerously expensive that the only viable means of compliance would be to join the Association of Zoos and Aquariums or the Zoological Association of America, for which there are exemptions. They argued that they are compelled to associate with those organizations and to subsidize the organizations’ speech and that the microchipping requirement constitutes a physical taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The owners are not compelled to join the AZA or ZAA and the Act does not effect a physical taking.View "Wilkins v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foie gras producers and sellers, appealed the district court's denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of California from enforcing California Health & Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 banned the sale of products that were the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. The court dismissed the State of California and Governor Brown from the lawsuit because they were immune from suit. The court concluded that the only product covered by section 25982 at issue in this appeal was foie gras; plaintiffs' Due Process Clause challenge failed because section 25982's definition for force feeding was not vague and the statute gave fair notice of prohibited conduct; and section 25982 did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not discriminatory, did not directly regulate interstate commerce, and did not substantially burden interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to raise a serious question that they were likely to succeed on the merits. View "Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 1992, Mo. Rev. Stat. 273.327 was enacted, requiring persons engaged in commercial animal care to obtain a license and exempted pounds and animal shelters from paying annual licensing and per-capita fees. In 2010, the General Assembly passed S.B. 795, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327. The reenacted version of section 273.327 eliminated animal shelters from the entities exempt from the payment of fees. In 2011, the General Assembly passed S.B. 161, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327 and cured any procedural defects in the passage of S.B. 795. The Humane Society subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting that the amended version of section 273.327 was unconstitutional because S.B. 795 was amended during its passage to change its original purpose. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the Humane Society's cause of action was moot as a result of the General Assembly's repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 in S.B. 161. View "Humane Society of the United States v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of New Castle County, befriended a stray dog called Maggie. They later turned Maggie over to the Kent County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). Subsequently, Petitioners told the SCPA they would like to adopt Maggie. After concluding that the SPCA had euthanized Maggie, Petitioners filed this action, seeking to compel the SPCA to comply with the state's Shelter Standards Law, including strict compliance with its euthanasia requirements. The SPCA moved to dismiss the action, claiming, among other things, that Petitioners lacked standing to pursue their claims. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action, concluding that Petitioners failed to satisfy the "legally protected interest" element of standing because they did not own Maggie, and their statement of interest to adopt Maggie was not sufficient to create a reasonably conceivable legally protected interest in Maggie. View "Gittman-Crowther v. Kent County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law