Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Greg Collier was indicted in August 2006 for fourth-degree extreme cruelty to animals after a horse he owned died. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State's request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State could retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State could retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar retrial on the lesser included offense. View "New Mexico v. Collier" on Justia Law

Campbell and Gemperline were attacked on different dates by a canine unit police dog (Spike). They filed suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 against the canine’s handler, the chief of police, and the city, alleging excessive force, failure to supervise, failure to properly train, and state law claims for assault and battery. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Prior to both bite incidents, the handler notified supervisors that he had been unable to keep up with maintenance training and repeatedly requested that they allow him time to attend training sessions, but his requests were denied. Spike’s state certifications lapsed for several months. There was evidence that Spike was involved in biting incidents with growing frequency in the first three years of his deployment in the field. A jury could also reasonably conclude that the handler acted in bad faith or in a wanton or reckless manner, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations about his conduct and statements at the time of the attacks. View "Campbell v. City of Springboro" on Justia Law

After Petitioner's dog, a Rotweiller mix, attacked Respondents' two-year-old daughter, causing serious injuries, Respondents brought a civil suit under W. Va. Code 19-20-20 against Petitioners requesting that the magistrate court order Petitioners' dog killed, alleging that the dog was vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other people. The county magistrate court ordered the dog killed. The circuit court affirmed. Petitioners appealed, arguing that section 19-20-20 does not provide a mechanism by which parties may bring a civil suit to have a dog destroyed. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the circuit court's order, holding that section 19-20-20 does not authorize a civil suit seeking destruction of a dog. View "Durham v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Fabrikant was arrested and arraigned on five counts of criminal animal cruelty, pursuant to New York Agriculture and Markets Law 353. All but two of her dogs were taken. The seized dogs were spayed or neutered and sent to live in foster homes pending conclusion of the criminal case. Fabrikant was ultimately acquitted but apparently never asked that her seized dogs be returned after the trial. She filed a pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the New York SPCA, several of its employees, and some of the prospective adopters who originally alerted the SPCA about the dogs’ conditions. The complaint included federal claims for malicious prosecution and for violations of her rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Accordingly, although they acted under color of state law, the SPCA defendants were protected by qualified immunity and could not be held liable for the spaying, neutering, or fostering out of Fabrikant’s dogs. Officers had probable cause to search Fabrikant’s house and arrest her. View "Fabrikant v. French" on Justia Law

Defendant’s llama escaped its pen and wandered off and he was charged with misdemeanor abandonment under the Illinois animal cruelty statute. Rather than hire a lawyer, defendant pled guilty and paid a $525 fine. Three years later, he pled guilty to a federal charge for possession of several hundred marijuana plants. The marijuana conviction called for a mandatory minimum 10 years in prison. But for the misdemeanor llama conviction, defendant could have avoided the mandatory minimum by qualifying for the statutory safety valve, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), and his guideline sentencing range would have been 18 to 24 months in prison. Counting the llama conviction as one criminal history point, his second point, prevented use of the safety valve, which is limited to defendants with no more than one point. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence of 10 years, finding that the llama conviction is similar to misdemeanors listed in U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c) as offenses that should not count for any criminal history points. Application of that provision would have allowed the district court to reach the result that it felt was just here. . View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against officials who seized numerous dogs from a kennel she ran on her property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claims and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against the county under Heck v. Humphrey where plaintiff did not allege that her 163 convictions for animal cruelty had been overturned and plaintiff conceded that several of her allegations underlying such claims were past the statue of limitations. As for the 2006 claims, plaintiff failed to dispute the district court's holding that she failed to exhaust her remedy under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.2. Plaintiff also failed to show an unconstitutional policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation of her rights. The court further held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against the Humane Society defendants because no evidence supported plaintiff's conspiracy allegations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Crawford v. Van Buren County, et al." on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted by a jury of violating and conspiring to violate the animal fighting prohibition of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. 2156(a) (the animal fighting statute), resulting from their participation in "gamefowl derbies," otherwise known as "cockfighting." Defendants raised several challenges on appeal. Upon review of the parties' arguments, the court held that the animal fighting statute was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause; that the provision of different elements of the crime in jurisdictions permitting animal fighting did not violate defendants' equal protection rights; and that the district court did not err in conducting Scott Lawson's trial jointly with the trials of his co-defendants. The court held, however, that the juror's misconduct violated Lawson's right to a fair trial, and therefore vacated the convictions for violating the animal fighting statute. The court also vacated the conspiracy convictions with respect to those defendants for which the conspiracy related solely to the animal fighting activities. Further, the court rejected the challenges made by several defendants to the illegal gambling convictions, and affirmed the convictions relating to those offenses as well as the conspiracy convictions for which illegal gambling was one of the objects of the conspiracy alleged. View "United States v. Lawson; United States v. Hutto; United States v. Hutto; United States v. Peeler; United States v. Dyal; United States v. Collins, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted for their roles in organizing, operating, and participating in "gamefowl derbies," otherwise known as "cockfighting." Defendants entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of conspiring to violate the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. 2156 (the animal fighting statute). At issue was whether Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting a criminal prohibition against animal fighting. The court held that the animal fighting statute prohibits activities that substantially affected interstate commerce and thus, was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. The court also held that the statute did not require the government to prove defendants' knowledge regarding the particular venture's nexus to interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Gibert; United States v. Benfield; United States v. Hoover; United States v. Grooms; United States v. Jeffcoat" on Justia Law

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded. View "Animal Found. of Great Falls v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After convicting seven defendants charged with operating a St. Louis area dog-fighting ring, the court sentenced all to a three-year term of supervised release and to payment of $100. Two defendants additionally received sentences of 16 and 18 months of incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the judge did not take on the role of a prosecutor and violate separation of powers by conducting independent research on dog fighting. The judge informed the parties of his research and carefully distinguished information in the memo from evidence related to the defendants. The court adequately justified the sentencing, finding the guidelines inadequate considering the number of dogs, dogs that had to be euthanized, the number of fights, extraordinary cruelty, and the leadership roles of the defendants.View "United States v. Courtland" on Justia Law