Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

The Animal Welfare Act does not directly address license renewal but does expressly authorize the USDA to promulgate and implement its own renewal standards. PETA filed suit challenging the license renewal process for animal exhibitors promulgated by the USDA through which the USDA may renew such license despite a licensee's noncompliance with the Act. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the USDA's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the Act's licensing regulations embody a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policy interests Congress has delegated to the USDA and were entitled to Chevron deference. View "PETA v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals who breed and sell animals, filed the underlying action in district court, challenging a 2012 rule in which the Fish and Wildlife Service designated as injurious four species of snakes. At issue on appeal was the shipment clause in the Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. 42(a)(1), which bars "any shipment" of certain injurious species of animals "between the continental United States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States." Plaintiffs argued that the Service lacks authority under the Lacey Act to prohibit transportation of the listed species between the 49 continental States. The court agreed with the district court that the shipment clause has no bearing on shipments of animals from one of the 49 continental States to another. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "U.S. Assoc. of Reptile Keepers v. Zinke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a quarter horse trainer, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for a writ of administrative mandamus. Specifically, petitioner challenges a license suspension and fine imposed upon him by the Board after finding that he violated regulations, California Code of Regulations, title 4, section 1844, subdivision (e)(9), by racing horses medicated with a drug, Clenbuterol, that the Board had temporarily suspended from authorized use. The court concluded that the Board's interpretation of the regulation at the time it extended or reenacted the Clenbuterol ban and in the instant litigation is not entitled to deference because the Board has vacillated. The court explained that, after considering the regulation's text and history, a temporary suspension of authorized use of a particular substance under section 1844.1 may not be extended beyond 12 months through reenactment or extension of the temporary suspension. Therefore, the allegations against and findings of regulatory violations by plaintiff had no legal basis, and the penalties imposed upon him were equally invalid. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "De La Torre v. California Horse Racing Board" on Justia Law

Big Cats of Serenity Springs was a Colorado-based non-profit that provided housing, food, and veterinary care for exotic animals. The facility was regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Three APHIS inspectors accompanied by sheriff’s deputies broke into the Big Cats facility without its permission to perform an unannounced inspection of two tiger cubs. But at the time the inspectors entered the facility, the cubs were at a veterinarian’s office receiving treatment, just as Big Cats had promised the APHIS inspectors the previous day. Big Cats and its directors sued the APHIS inspectors for the unauthorized entry pursuant to "Bivens v. Six Unknown Narcotics Agents," (403 U.S. 388 (1971)) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting the entry was an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the APHIS inspectors’ motion to dismiss the complaint and they filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the court’s failure to grant qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Big Cats’ complaint stated a claim for relief under "Bivens." No APHIS inspector would reasonably have believed unauthorized forcible entry of the Big Cats facility was permissible, and therefore Big Cats and its directors could have a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. But the Court reversed on Big Cats’ civil rights claim because the federal inspectors were not liable under section 1983 in the circumstances here. View "Big Cats of Serenity Springs v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Cynthia Huntsman operated a farm on which she kept multiple species of wild animals that are regulated by the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act. Huntsman had no permit to possess “dangerous wild animals” under the Act. The Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) ordered the transfer of multiple dangerous wild animals found in Huntsman’s facility to a temporary holding facility established by the ODA. A Stark County Common Pleas Court judge granted Huntsman a temporary restraining order against the ODA and ordered the ODA to return the seized animals to Huntsman. The director of the ODA sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding in the underlying case and ordered him to vacate his previous orders in the case, holding that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Huntsman and her farm. View "State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture v. Forchione" on Justia Law

During the investigation of a complaint that Arlie Risner was hunting without permission, Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Wildlife (“ODNR”) officers seized parts of an antlered white-tailed deer. Risner later pled no contest to hunting without permission, and the court ordered the meat and antlers forfeited to ODNR. ODNR subsequently notified Risner that he owed $27,851 in restitution to the state pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 1531.201. Risner filed a declaratory-judgment action against ODNR alleging that the order of restitution was illegal and unconstitutional because the state had taken possession of the deer in the criminal proceeding. The trial court ruled in favor of Risner. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 1531.201(B) permits ODNR to file a civil action to recover the civil restitution value of an antlered white-tailed deer even though it had seized the deer meat and antlers as evidence in the investigation of an offender who was convicted of a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 1531 or 1533 or a division rule and was awarded possession as a result of the conviction. View "Risner v. Ohio Dep’t of Natural Res., Ohio Div. of Wildlife" on Justia Law

California Exposition and State Fairs (Cal Expo), regulated by Food and Agriculture Code 3301, is responsible for organizing the State Fair every July and enters into an agreement every year with the University of California at Davis School of Veterinary Medicine. The School sets up and manages the livestock nursery exhibit where pregnant pigs and other animals are put on display for three weeks to give birth and nurse. Cal Expo provides the land, tent, support infrastructure, and financial compensation, while the School provides the animals, equipment, and staff. Transporting pigs during the last two weeks of their pregnancy causes suffering due to stress and physical discomfort, potentially resulting in an aborted pregnancy. At the fair, the School places the pregnant pigs in farrowing crates, so small that the mother pigs cannot turn around or walk, for the three-week duration of the State Fair. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting a section 526a taxpayer action, premised on the theory that defendants waste taxpayer money and staff time by obtaining, transporting, and exhibiting pregnant pigs. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, agreeing that California’s animal cruelty laws (Pen. Code, 597, 597t.)are not enforceable through a taxpayer action. View "Animal Legal Def.Fund v. CA Exposition & St. Fairs" on Justia Law

Lynn Eshleman was employed with the DeKalb County Police Department as a law enforcement officer and dog handler, and in connection with her employment, she took care of Andor, a police dog trained to assist in the apprehension of persons suspected of criminal activity. When Eshleman was off-duty, Andor lived with her at her Walton County home, down the street from Benjamin Key. One day in 2011, Eshleman put Andor into a portable kennel outside her home, but she evidently failed to secure the kennel door. As a result, Andor escaped into the neighborhood, where the dog encountered Key’s eleven-year-old son. According to Key, the dog attacked his son, causing the child to sustain serious injuries to his arm. Key sued Eshleman, alleging that she failed to restrain Andor, and Eshleman moved for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity. The trial court denied her motion, Eshleman appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In this case, there was no evidence that DeKalb County gave specific direction to Eshleman about the extent to which she was to keep Andor restrained when she was not working. Key argued that the law imposed an absolute and sufficiently specific duty upon Eshleman to keep the dog under restraint, and in support of this contention, pointed to OCGA 51-2-7 and a Walton County ordinance. The statute recognized that "the keeper of an animal known to have vicious or dangerous propensities owed a duty of care with respect to the management and restraint of the animal for the protection of those who may come into contact with it." But the question, in the context of official immunity, was not merely whether an officer owed a duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that was particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one. "The duties that Eshleman was alleged to have violated were not ministerial ones because, although the duties reflected in OCGA 51-2-7 and the county ordinance may be definite, they do not require merely the carrying out of a specified task. [. . .] They require, instead, an exercise of personal deliberation and judgment about what is reasonable in the particular circumstances presented." The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground of official immunity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that denial was also reversed. View "Eshelman v. Key" on Justia Law

This case concerns Lolita, a killer whale held in captivity since 1970, who performs each day at the Seaquarium. ALDF filed suit against the USDA for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Seaquarium houses Lolita in conditions that violate the Animal Welfare Act's (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131-59, standards for granting a license under 7 U.S.C. 2133-34. The district court granted summary judgment to USDA. The court held that USDA’s renewal of Seaquarium’s April 2012 license is a final agency action subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. 706(2). On the merits, the court concluded that USDA’s licensing regulations constitute a reasonable policy choice balancing the conflicting congressional aims of due process and animal welfare, and the AWA licensing scheme is entitled to deference by the court. USDA has the discretionary enforcement authority to revoke a license due to noncompliance. Only Congress possesses the power to limit the agency’s discretion and demand annual, substantive compliance with animal welfare standards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. USDA" on Justia Law

After issuing an environmental impact statement (EIS), the National Park Service adopted a plan for the management of deer in Rock Creek National Park in Washington, D.C. The plan involved the killing of white-tailed deer. Objectors argued that the plan violated statutes governing management of the Park and was not adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the EIS did not meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Noting that the Organic Act expressly provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may also provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any said parks, monuments, or reservations,” so that the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act is reasonable. Given the impact of deer on plant life and vehicle collisions, the decision is not arbitrary. Finding no violation of NEPA, the court concluded that the EIS was not required to consider the psychological harm that some visitors may suffer from simply knowing that the intentional killing of deer happens at Rock Creek Park. View "Grunewald v. Jarvis" on Justia Law