Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

A man named Alonzo Kyles was indicted for animal cruelty after police found a cat soaked in bleach in an apartment building's basement stairwell. Kyles admitted to pouring bleach to scare the cat away because he was afraid of cats. The cat had red and swollen paws, no collar, and was unclaimed by anyone in the building. The cat was taken to an animal hospital where a veterinarian treated it for ulcerations, a common symptom of bleach exposure. Kyles was found guilty of animal cruelty and sentenced to nine months in jail.The Eighth District Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed Kyles's conviction. The court held that the statute under which Kyles was convicted, R.C. 959.131(C), required the State to prove that the cat was a "companion animal." The court interpreted the statute to mean that only dogs and cats that are "kept" qualify as companion animals. Since the State did not provide sufficient evidence that the cat was "kept," the court found the conviction unsupported by sufficient evidence.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and reversed the Eighth District's decision. The court held that R.C. 959.131(C) protects all dogs and cats, not just those that are "kept." The court emphasized that the statute's language includes "any dog or cat regardless of where it is kept," meaning the protection extends to all dogs and cats without regard to their living situation. The case was remanded to the Eighth District Court of Appeals to consider Kyles's remaining arguments. View "State v. Kyles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's partial denial of Defendant's motion for summary judgment in this dog bite case, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.Defendant in this case was a deputy sheriff and K-9 handler who hosted a cookout for friends at his home. Plaintiff, who attended the cookout, was bitten by Defendant's canine partner, Xyrem. Plaintiff brought suit, asserting a common-law negligence claim and a claim under Ohio Rev. Code 955.28, which imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a dog in certain situations. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, determining that Defendant was immune from liability under section 955.28(B). Defendant appealed the denial of summary judgment on the negligence claim. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, as a matter of law, Defendant was not manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities during the evening of the dog bite. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether Defendant was manifestly acting outside the scope of his employment during the events leading up to Plaintiff's injury. View "Harris v. Hilderbrand" on Justia Law

In this animal seizure case, the Supreme Court denied a writ of procedendo to compel Respondent, Willoughby Municipal Court Judge Marisa Cornachio, to enter a final judgment regarding a magistrate's probable cause finding in an animal seizure case, holding that the case was moot.Relators commenced this action to compel Judge Cornachio to issue a final judgment in the seizure case. Judge Cornachio subsequently issued a judgment entry in the seizure case. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that because Judge Cornachio provided the relief that Relators sought in procedendo and because procedendo will not compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed, the case was moot. View "State ex rel. Bechtel v. Cornachio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted the State's appeal from the decision of the court of appeals concluding that a prior designation as a dangerous dog is a prerequisite to its owner being prosecuted for failing to confine a dangerous dog in violation of of Ohio Rev. Code 955.22(D), holding that a prior designation of dangerousness pursuant to section 955.222 or otherwise is not a prerequisite to prosecution for failing to abide by the statute's dangerous dog laws.Defendant was convicted of failing to confine a dangerous dog. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a previous dangerous dog designation is a prerequisite to finding a violation of section 955.22(D). The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) neither due process nor statutory language requires a prior dangerous dog designation before a defendant can be prosecuted for noncompliance with section 955.22's dangerous dog provisions; but (2) the State failed to meet its burden of offering sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for failure to control a dangerous dog. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Cynthia Huntsman operated a farm on which she kept multiple species of wild animals that are regulated by the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act. Huntsman had no permit to possess “dangerous wild animals” under the Act. The Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) ordered the transfer of multiple dangerous wild animals found in Huntsman’s facility to a temporary holding facility established by the ODA. A Stark County Common Pleas Court judge granted Huntsman a temporary restraining order against the ODA and ordered the ODA to return the seized animals to Huntsman. The director of the ODA sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court granted a peremptory writ of prohibition to prevent the judge from proceeding in the underlying case and ordered him to vacate his previous orders in the case, holding that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order the return of the dangerous wild animals seized from Huntsman and her farm. View "State ex rel. Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Agriculture v. Forchione" on Justia Law