Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around an incident that occurred during the 2018 Kentucky Derby. Joi Denise Roby and her husband were invited by Kyle McGinty to the backside stable area of Churchill Downs, a restricted area not open to the public. Roby, who had experience with horses, interacted with the horses in their stalls, including a stable pony named Henry. Henry, owned by Bradley Racing Stables and William Buff Bradley, was used to escort racehorses to and from the track, but was not actively engaged in this activity on the day of the incident. As Roby approached Henry in his stall, he lunged and bit her. Roby subsequently sued Bradley and Churchill Downs for breaching their duty to maintain a safe premises.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Bradley and Churchill Downs, holding that the Farm Animals Activity Act (FAAA) exemption did not apply to Churchill Downs because the stabling of a horse was a farm animal activity, not a horse racing activity. The court also ruled that Roby was a licensee because she conferred no benefit to Churchill Downs and no evidence in the record supported a breach of duty. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court orders granting summary judgment for Bradley and Churchill Downs, finding that the horse racing exemption applied because live racing was occurring, Roby was injured after being bitten by a horse located on the premises, and the horse was used to escort racehorses to and from the track.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the FAAA horse racing exemption did not apply to Roby's injuries. The court reasoned that while horse racing activities were occurring at Churchill Downs during the Kentucky Derby, neither Bradley, Churchill Downs, nor Roby were engaged in horse racing activities at the time Roby was bitten. The court also held that Louisville Metro Code of Ordinances § 91.028(A), which imposes liability for any personal injury caused by an animal, did not apply to Roby's injuries due to the FAAA's limitation of liability. View "Bradley Racing Stables, LLC v. Roby" on Justia Law

The case involves Scott Johnson, Harlene Hoyt, and Covey Find Kennel, LLC, who challenged the constitutionality of a Kansas statute that allows warrantless inspections of their homestead, where Mr. Johnson operates a business that houses and trains bird dogs. They also claimed that their constitutional right to travel was infringed by a statutory requirement that they make the premises available for inspection within 30 minutes of the arrival of an inspector. The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of their right-to-travel claim but remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Mr. Johnson’s business is closely regulated and, if so, whether warrantless inspections are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the boarding or training kennel industry was not clearly closely regulated, and the government had not shown that warrantless searches were necessary. The court also held that the regulations did not impose burdens beyond those commonly borne by owners of businesses who travel away from the locations of their businesses, and thus did not violate the plaintiffs' right to travel. View "Johnson v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who was bitten by a dog at a facility operated by an animal welfare organization. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the organization, invoking Delaware's "dog bite statute," which imposes strict liability on a dog owner for any injury caused by the dog. The Superior Court of Delaware granted summary judgment in favor of the organization, ruling that the statute does not apply to animal welfare organizations. The court reasoned that the statute was intended to target irresponsible dog owners who keep vicious dogs as pets, not organizations like the defendant.The Superior Court's decision was based on its interpretation of the legislative intent behind the dog bite statute. The court also held that the plaintiff could not establish negligence on the part of the organization without expert testimony, as the standard of care applicable to animal shelters was outside the common knowledge of laypersons.The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of the dog bite statute. It found that the statute unambiguously imposes strict liability on any person who owns, keeps, harbors, or is the custodian of a dog, without any exception for animal welfare organizations. The court also disagreed with the lower court's requirement for expert testimony to establish negligence, ruling that the standard of care in handling a domestic animal with known vicious propensities is within the common knowledge of laypersons. The Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Riad v. Brandywine Valley SPCA, Inc." on Justia Law

Sylvan Plowright filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County, its police chief, and two of its police officers after one of the officers, Sergio Cordova, fatally shot Plowright’s dog, Niles, during an investigation. The district court dismissed Plowright’s complaint, concluding that Cordova was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate any clearly established right when he shot Niles.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the use of deadly force against a domestic animal constitutes a seizure of its owner’s property subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. The court found that under the facts alleged in the complaint, no reasonable officer in Cordova’s position could have believed that Niles posed an imminent danger, and therefore, his decision to shoot Niles falls short of that requirement. The court reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s § 1983 claim against Cordova and remanded for further proceedings. The court also reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cordova. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plowright’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a second officer, as well as his claims against the county and its police chief. View "Plowright v. Miami Dade County" on Justia Law

The case involves a wrongful-death action initiated by Veronica Edwards and Corey D. Hatcher, Sr., following the death of Corey Demills Hatcher, Jr. The deceased died from injuries sustained when his vehicle collided with horses on a road. The plaintiffs sued the owners of the horses, Kimberly Johnson Crowder and Carole A. Phillipsen, as well as Southern Sportsman Hunting Lodge, Inc., its owners, and the McCurdy Plantation Horse Association, which hosted a trail ride on Southern Sportsman's property. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to use proper fencing to corral the horses, leading to the accident.The Lowndes Circuit Court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court determined that the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claim was the exclusive remedy available under Alabama Code § 3-5-3(a), which provides a cause of action against livestock owners who knowingly or willfully place their animals on a public highway. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to produce substantial evidence to support their claim that the defendants knowingly placed the horses on the highway.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court clarified that § 3-5-3(a) creates a cause of action that did not exist at common law, rather than shielding certain defendants from liability. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence that the defendants knowingly placed the horses on the highway, as required by § 3-5-3(a). Therefore, the plaintiffs could not pursue any cause of action against the defendants. View "Edwards v. Crowder" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parties over the right to quiet enjoyment of property versus the right to hunt and harvest wildlife. The Dickersons, who own approximately 220 acres in Booneville, Mississippi, filed a complaint against the Allens and Cain, members of the Sand Hill Hunting Club. The Dickersons alleged that the Allens' and Cain's hunting dogs trespassed on their property, interfered with their preferred method of still hunting, and disturbed the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of their land. They sought injunctions to prevent the Allens' dogs from entering their property and to stop the Allens from parking or walking on any road right-of-way adjoining their land.The Prentiss County Chancery Court found that the repeated intrusion of deer hunting dogs onto the Dickersons' property constituted a private nuisance. The court granted permanent injunctions disallowing the hunting dogs from going onto the property. The court also ruled that if any of the Allens were found to be parked on the public road or public road right-of-way within sight of the Dickersons' property when deer dogs were found to be running on the Dickersons' property, it would be prima facie proof that the Allens violated the court’s injunctions. The court denied the Dickersons' request for monetary damages due to lack of sufficient evidence.The Allens appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. They raised several issues, including whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to specify its path to finding private nuisance, whether deer hunting with dogs can be considered a private nuisance when done within the parameters of the law and in an area long known for dog hunting, and whether the trial court’s injunction adequately addresses the nuisance. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the trial court's finding of private nuisance was supported by the evidence and that its issuance of a permanent injunction was within its judicial authority and adequately addressed the nuisance. View "Allen v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

The case involves the Alaska Trappers Association and the National Trappers Association (collectively, the Trappers) who challenged a city ordinance enacted by the City of Valdez. The ordinance regulated animal trapping within the city limits, barring trapping in certain areas for the purpose of protecting public safety and domesticated animals. The Trappers argued that the ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional, asserting that it was preempted by state law and violated the Alaska Constitution.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Valdez, granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Valdez. The court concluded that the legislature's delegation of authority to the Board of Game was limited and did not grant the Board exclusive control of trapping. The court also determined that the ordinance did not directly contradict state regulations.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not prohibited by the Alaska Constitution or the legislature’s delegation of authority over fish and game to the Board. The court concluded that the ordinance was not impliedly prohibited by state law, as it was enacted pursuant to Valdez's authority to regulate land use and public safety, and was not substantially irreconcilable with the State's authority to regulate the conservation, development, or utilization of game. View "Alaska Trappers Association, Inc. v. City of Valdez" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over the ownership of a purebred show dog named Oscar. The parties involved are Oscar's breeder, Elizabeth "Betsy" Shauck, and Dave Jennings and Emily McLeod, who have raised Oscar since he was a puppy. Dave and Emily filed a petition to quiet title to Oscar against Betsy, who counterclaimed for breach of contract, replevin, conversion, for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, and to quiet title. Betsy's preliminary injunction counterclaim asked the district court to prevent Dave and Emily from harboring Oscar and to order his immediate return to her.The district court held a three-day hearing, which was supposed to be on Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction. However, the court expanded the scope of the hearing and made findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of all issues pending in the underlying lawsuit, including Oscar's ownership, contract disputes, and damages. Dave and Emily appealed this decision, arguing that the district court denied their due process rights by deciding the case on the merits when it had only set the hearing on Betsy's preliminary injunction.The Kansas Court of Appeals panel held that the district court violated Dave and Emily's due process rights by expanding the scope of the hearing without notice. However, instead of remanding the case, the panel analyzed the parties' ownership interests in Oscar and held that Dave and Betsy co-owned Oscar. Betsy then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the panel. The court agreed with the panel that the district court erred by expanding the scope of the hearing on Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the district court's decision to consolidate the hearing on Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction with a trial on the case's merits without informing the parties was a denial of due process and an error of law. The court also agreed with the panel's conclusion that the district court's failure prejudiced Dave and Emily. However, the court held that the panel erred by addressing the case's merits after correctly concluding that the district court erred. The court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jennings v. Shauck" on Justia Law

In this case, a police officer, Michael Roane, shot and killed Tina Ray’s dog while attempting to serve an arrest warrant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Roane and remanded the case for trial. The crux of the case was the dispute over Roane's perception of the threat posed by the dog. Roane asserted that he believed the dog was unrestrained and posed an immediate threat to his safety. However, Ray and other witnesses testified that Roane had stopped his retreat and took a step towards the dog before shooting, suggesting that he knew the dog could no longer reach him and did not pose an imminent threat. The Court of Appeals held that this dispute over material facts was for a jury to resolve, not a court, and could not be decided prior to trial. The court also held that if a jury credits Ray's allegations and draws permissible inferences in her favor, it could infer that Roane's shooting of the dog was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The court also rejected Roane's claim to qualified immunity. View "Ray v. Roane" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff, Joni Fraser, who was attacked by two pit bulls owned by a tenant, Hebe Crocker, who rented a single-family residence from landlords Ali Farvid and Lilyana Amezcua. Fraser sued both Crocker and the landlords. After settling with Crocker, the case proceeded against the landlords. A jury found that the landlords had actual knowledge of the dangerous propensity of the dogs and could have prevented foreseeable harm to Fraser, awarding her damages exceeding $600,000. However, the trial court granted the landlords' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), finding no substantial evidence to demonstrate the landlords' knowledge of the dogs' dangerous propensities.Under California law, a landlord who lacks actual knowledge of a tenant's dog's vicious nature cannot be held liable when the dog attacks a third person. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling. The Court held that the email from a neighbor mentioning "guard dogs" did not constitute substantial evidence that the landlords knew or must have known the dogs were dangerous. The Court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the landlords' alleged false statements denying knowledge of the dogs constituted evidence of their knowledge of the dogs' dangerous nature. The Court concluded that there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that the landlords knew or should have known the dogs were dangerous. View "Fraser v. Farvid" on Justia Law