Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011, an Ohio man released more than 50 exotic animals before committing suicide. Partially in response, the state enacted the Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act, Ohio Rev. Code 935.01–935.99. All persons in possession of dangerous wild animals before September 5, 2012, were required to register with the Ohio Department of Agriculture and to microchip each registered animal upon registration. The Act prohibits possession of a dangerous wild animal after January 1, 2014. A person already in possession of a dangerous wild animal and wishing to continue to possess the animal after that date may obtain a wildlife shelter permit or a wildlife propagation permit. Owners of exotic animals challenged the Act as violating First Amendment rights to freedom of association and speech, arguing that the permitting requirements are so onerously expensive that the only viable means of compliance would be to join the Association of Zoos and Aquariums or the Zoological Association of America, for which there are exemptions. They argued that they are compelled to associate with those organizations and to subsidize the organizations’ speech and that the microchipping requirement constitutes a physical taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court denied injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The owners are not compelled to join the AZA or ZAA and the Act does not effect a physical taking.View "Wilkins v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Defendant leased a single-family dwelling to Tenants pursuant to a lease agreement in which Tenants were permitted to keep pets but would be responsible for any property damage or disturbance caused by their pets. Three times in one month, a dog owned by Tenants allegedly attacked Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued Defendants seeking damages on a common law theory of negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there were no triable issues as to whether Defendants were ever in possession of control over Tenants' dog, the superior court did not err in its judgment. View "Fields v. Hayden" on Justia Law

Decedent died as a result of the injuries he received when he was attacked by several pit bull terriers. Petitioner, the administratrix of Decedent's estate, brought this action against Respondents, the Monroe County Commission and Patricia Green, the Monroe County dog warden, alleging, inter alia, that Respondents failed to impound the dogs due to non-payment of taxes and for not having proper registration and failed to impound and/or destroy the dogs for being vicious. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, asserting the public duty doctrine and statutory immunities. Petitioner subsequently moved to amend her complaint to incorporate allegations of fact to support her claim that a "special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine applied. Before ruling on the motion to amend, the circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's case on the basis of statutory immunities and in failing to grant Petitioner's motion to amend her complaint. Remanded. View "Bowden v. Monroe County Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foie gras producers and sellers, appealed the district court's denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of California from enforcing California Health & Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 banned the sale of products that were the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. The court dismissed the State of California and Governor Brown from the lawsuit because they were immune from suit. The court concluded that the only product covered by section 25982 at issue in this appeal was foie gras; plaintiffs' Due Process Clause challenge failed because section 25982's definition for force feeding was not vague and the statute gave fair notice of prohibited conduct; and section 25982 did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not discriminatory, did not directly regulate interstate commerce, and did not substantially burden interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to raise a serious question that they were likely to succeed on the merits. View "Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards v. Harris" on Justia Law

In 1992, Mo. Rev. Stat. 273.327 was enacted, requiring persons engaged in commercial animal care to obtain a license and exempted pounds and animal shelters from paying annual licensing and per-capita fees. In 2010, the General Assembly passed S.B. 795, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327. The reenacted version of section 273.327 eliminated animal shelters from the entities exempt from the payment of fees. In 2011, the General Assembly passed S.B. 161, which repealed and reenacted section 273.327 and cured any procedural defects in the passage of S.B. 795. The Humane Society subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting that the amended version of section 273.327 was unconstitutional because S.B. 795 was amended during its passage to change its original purpose. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the Humane Society's cause of action was moot as a result of the General Assembly's repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 in S.B. 161. View "Humane Society of the United States v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, residents of New Castle County, befriended a stray dog called Maggie. They later turned Maggie over to the Kent County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). Subsequently, Petitioners told the SCPA they would like to adopt Maggie. After concluding that the SPCA had euthanized Maggie, Petitioners filed this action, seeking to compel the SPCA to comply with the state's Shelter Standards Law, including strict compliance with its euthanasia requirements. The SPCA moved to dismiss the action, claiming, among other things, that Petitioners lacked standing to pursue their claims. The Court of Chancery dismissed the action, concluding that Petitioners failed to satisfy the "legally protected interest" element of standing because they did not own Maggie, and their statement of interest to adopt Maggie was not sufficient to create a reasonably conceivable legally protected interest in Maggie. View "Gittman-Crowther v. Kent County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals" on Justia Law

Plaintiff received a wound from a dog bite from a pit bull. Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, the owner of the building where the dog bite occurred. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding that the dog bite at issue occurred within the enclosure of the owner or keeper of the dog. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the second-floor apartment where the dog bite occurred was a separate enclosure for purposes of R.I. Gen. Laws 4-13-16. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) absent an inquiry into whether the second-floor apartment was kept locked and whether Defendant was excluded from the premises, it was impossible to determine whether the second-floor apartment was a separate enclosure within Defendant's house; and (2) there was a disputed issue of material fact was to whether Defendant knew of or permitted the dog's presence on his premises. View "Carreiro v. Tobin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when the van she was driving hit a cow on a public road. Plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the owner of the property where the cow was kept and the two men who may have owned the cow. Supreme Court granted summary judgment for two of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed as to those defendants and also granted summary judgment as to the third defendant, concluding that, pursuant to Bard v. Jahnke, injuries inflicted by domestic animals "may only proceed under strict liability based on the owner's knowledge of the animal's vicious propensities, not on theories of common-law negligence." The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the rule of Bard does not bar a suit for negligence when a farm animal has been allowed to stray from the property where it is kept. View "Hastings v. Sauve" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Prior to the ride, Plaintiff signed a release (waiver) waiving her right to sue Defendants, Sundance-related entities (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the waiver was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) and that it violated the public policy expressed in the Equine Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Equine Act does not invalidate preinjury releases for ordinary negligence, nor does the Equine Act evidence a public policy bargain struck by the legislature; and (2) therefore, the waiver is enforceable. View "Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. " on Justia Law

The Medlens' dog Avery escaped the family's backyard and was picked up by animal control. Before the Medlens could retrieve Avery, shelter worker Carla Strickland mistakenly placed Avery on the euthanasia list, and Avery was put to sleep. The Medlens sued Strickland for causing Avery's death and sought damages for Avery's "intrinsic value." The trial court dismissed the suit with prejudice, concluding that Texas law barred such damages. The court of appeals reversed, becoming the first Texas court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether emotional-injury damages were recoverable for the negligent destruction of a dog. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under established legal doctrine, recovery in pet-death cases is, barring legislative reclassification, limited to "loss of value, not loss of relationship." View "Strickland v. Medlen" on Justia Law