Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Greg Collier was indicted in August 2006 for fourth-degree extreme cruelty to animals after a horse he owned died. A jury acquitted Defendant of felony extreme cruelty to animals but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor cruelty to animals, on which the district court, at the State's request, instructed the jury without objection from Defendant. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the State could retry Defendant for the lesser offense, which was not explicitly charged in the indictment, without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State could retry Defendant for the lesser included offense because retrial after a mistrial caused by jury deadlock does not violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Furthermore, the Court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar retrial on the lesser included offense. View "New Mexico v. Collier" on Justia Law

Bumper Boy holds two patents on improvements to electronic animal collars; the 082 patent is a continuation-in-part of the 014 patent. Although the 082 patent contains some new matter, the asserted claims from the 082 patent are supported by the 014 patent specification. Both patents generally disclose and claim a collar having “high point surfaces” that extend the inside surface of the collar above the base of electrodes 24 toward the animal “to relieve and distribute the load caused by collar tension around the animal’s neck” and reduce discomfort. The district court construed “inside surface” as “the portion of the collar housing facing inwards towards the animal” and “electrode base” as “the portion of the electrode where it intersects the inside surface of the collar housing” and held that Radio Shack and Innotek did not infringe the patents. The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to claim construction, but reversed with respect to the district court’s reliance on equitable estoppel. View "Radio Sys. Corp. v Lalor" on Justia Law

After a three-year rulemaking process, the FWS found that, due to the effects of global climate change, the polar bear was likely to become an endangered species and faced the threat of extinction within the foreseeable future (Listing Rule). The agency thus concluded that the polar bear should be listed as a threatened species. A number of industry groups, environmental organizations, and states challenged the Listing Rule as either overly restrictive or insufficiently protective of the polar bear. After a hearing on the parties' submissions, the district court granted summary judgment to the FWS and rejected all challenges to the Listing Rule. Given the evident thoroughness and care of the agency's explanation for its decision, the court concluded that the challenges to the Listing Rule "amount to nothing more than competing views about policy and science." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation" on Justia Law

Casitas Water District operates the Ventura River Project, which is owned by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and provides water to Ventura County, California, using dams, reservoirs, a canal, pump stations, and many miles of pipeline. In 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the West Coast steelhead trout as an endangered species and determined that the primary cause of its decline was loss of habitat due to water development, including impassable dams. Casitas faced liability if continued operation of the Project resulted in harm to the steelhead, 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1), 1540(a)–(b). In 2003, NMFS issued a biological opinion concerning operation of a fish ladder to relieve Casitas of liability. Casitas opened the Robles fish ladder, then filed suit, asserting that the biological opinion operating criteria breached its 1956 Contract with the government or amounted to uncompensated taking of Casitas’s property. The Claims Court dismissed, citing the sovereign acts doctrine. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of the contract claim, but reversed dismissal of Casitas’s takings claim. The court again dismissed, holding that Casitas had failed to show that the operating criteria had thus far resulted in any reduction of water deliveries, so a takings claim was not yet ripe. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, the youth court found that E.M.R., a youth under the age of eighteen, had committed five misdemeanor offenses of "dog at large" and one felony offense of aggravated animal cruelty. The convictions stemmed from E.M.R.'s treatment of her dogs and horses. E.M.R. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the youth court's instruction to the jury on the legislative purpose of the Youth Court Act was prejudicial error and required reversal of the aggravated animal cruelty adjudication; and (2) the youth court correctly declined to dismiss the "dog at large" charges.View "State v. E.M.R." on Justia Law

This case arose out of three biting incidents involving a dog owned by Respondent. After the first bite, the City of Lino Lakes designated Respondent's dog as "potentially dangerous," and after the second bite, the City designated the dog as "dangerous." After the third bite, the City ordered the dog to be destroyed. The court of appeals reversed the City's decisions, holding that Appellant's inability to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation violated his right to procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upheld the City's designation of the dog as "dangerous," and affirmed the City's order to destroy the dog, holding (1) Respondent was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation; and (2) substantial evidence supported the City's decisions. View "Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes" on Justia Law

Ohio's equine-activities-immunity statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.321, provides immunity from liability for harm sustained by an equine activity participant allegedly resulting from the inherent risk of equine activities. In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine when an injured person is a "spectator" and therefore an "equine activity participant" whose claim for damages is barred by statute. Appellee assisted in the care and management of horses and was kicked in the head by a horse when she went to the aid of Appellant, who was unloading an untrained horse from its trailer. Appellant argued that he was immune from liability pursuant to section 2305.321. The trial court concluded that the statute barred Appellee's claim because (1) she was a spectator, i.e., she was present at the unloading of the horse and "noticed" that event, and (2) thus, Appellee was an "equine activity participant" when she was injured. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that one who purposely places herself in a location where equine activities are occurring and who sees such an activity is a "spectator" and hence an "equine activity participant" within the meaning of section 2305.321(A)(3)(g). Remanded. View "Smith v. Landfair" on Justia Law

Campbell and Gemperline were attacked on different dates by a canine unit police dog (Spike). They filed suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 against the canine’s handler, the chief of police, and the city, alleging excessive force, failure to supervise, failure to properly train, and state law claims for assault and battery. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Prior to both bite incidents, the handler notified supervisors that he had been unable to keep up with maintenance training and repeatedly requested that they allow him time to attend training sessions, but his requests were denied. Spike’s state certifications lapsed for several months. There was evidence that Spike was involved in biting incidents with growing frequency in the first three years of his deployment in the field. A jury could also reasonably conclude that the handler acted in bad faith or in a wanton or reckless manner, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations about his conduct and statements at the time of the attacks. View "Campbell v. City of Springboro" on Justia Law

After Petitioner's dog, a Rotweiller mix, attacked Respondents' two-year-old daughter, causing serious injuries, Respondents brought a civil suit under W. Va. Code 19-20-20 against Petitioners requesting that the magistrate court order Petitioners' dog killed, alleging that the dog was vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other people. The county magistrate court ordered the dog killed. The circuit court affirmed. Petitioners appealed, arguing that section 19-20-20 does not provide a mechanism by which parties may bring a civil suit to have a dog destroyed. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the circuit court's order, holding that section 19-20-20 does not authorize a civil suit seeking destruction of a dog. View "Durham v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law