Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of three biting incidents involving a dog owned by Respondent. After the first bite, the City of Lino Lakes designated Respondent's dog as "potentially dangerous," and after the second bite, the City designated the dog as "dangerous." After the third bite, the City ordered the dog to be destroyed. The court of appeals reversed the City's decisions, holding that Appellant's inability to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation violated his right to procedural due process. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upheld the City's designation of the dog as "dangerous," and affirmed the City's order to destroy the dog, holding (1) Respondent was not constitutionally entitled to a hearing to challenge the "potentially dangerous" designation; and (2) substantial evidence supported the City's decisions. View "Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes" on Justia Law

Ohio's equine-activities-immunity statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.321, provides immunity from liability for harm sustained by an equine activity participant allegedly resulting from the inherent risk of equine activities. In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine when an injured person is a "spectator" and therefore an "equine activity participant" whose claim for damages is barred by statute. Appellee assisted in the care and management of horses and was kicked in the head by a horse when she went to the aid of Appellant, who was unloading an untrained horse from its trailer. Appellant argued that he was immune from liability pursuant to section 2305.321. The trial court concluded that the statute barred Appellee's claim because (1) she was a spectator, i.e., she was present at the unloading of the horse and "noticed" that event, and (2) thus, Appellee was an "equine activity participant" when she was injured. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that one who purposely places herself in a location where equine activities are occurring and who sees such an activity is a "spectator" and hence an "equine activity participant" within the meaning of section 2305.321(A)(3)(g). Remanded. View "Smith v. Landfair" on Justia Law

Campbell and Gemperline were attacked on different dates by a canine unit police dog (Spike). They filed suit under 42 U.S.C 1983 against the canine’s handler, the chief of police, and the city, alleging excessive force, failure to supervise, failure to properly train, and state law claims for assault and battery. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Prior to both bite incidents, the handler notified supervisors that he had been unable to keep up with maintenance training and repeatedly requested that they allow him time to attend training sessions, but his requests were denied. Spike’s state certifications lapsed for several months. There was evidence that Spike was involved in biting incidents with growing frequency in the first three years of his deployment in the field. A jury could also reasonably conclude that the handler acted in bad faith or in a wanton or reckless manner, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations about his conduct and statements at the time of the attacks. View "Campbell v. City of Springboro" on Justia Law

After Petitioner's dog, a Rotweiller mix, attacked Respondents' two-year-old daughter, causing serious injuries, Respondents brought a civil suit under W. Va. Code 19-20-20 against Petitioners requesting that the magistrate court order Petitioners' dog killed, alleging that the dog was vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other people. The county magistrate court ordered the dog killed. The circuit court affirmed. Petitioners appealed, arguing that section 19-20-20 does not provide a mechanism by which parties may bring a civil suit to have a dog destroyed. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the circuit court's order, holding that section 19-20-20 does not authorize a civil suit seeking destruction of a dog. View "Durham v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Under Kentucky's dog-bite liability statutes, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages caused by the dog. This case presented the questions whether a landlord can be liable under the statutory scheme's broad definition of "owner" and whether that liability can extend to injuries caused by a tenant's dog off the leased premises. In this case the attack occurred across the street from the rented property. The trial court granted summary judgment for the landlords under Ireland v. Raymond, which held that a landlord's liability for attacks by a tenant's dog does not extend to attacks that occur off the leased premises. The court of appeals affirmed, also relying on Ireland. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord can be an "owner" of a tenant's dog for the purposes of liability under certain circumstances; (2) any such liability extends only to injuries caused on or immediately adjacent to the premises; and (3) for that reason, the landlord in this case was not liable under the statutes. View "Benningfield v. Zinsmeister" on Justia Law

Fabrikant was arrested and arraigned on five counts of criminal animal cruelty, pursuant to New York Agriculture and Markets Law 353. All but two of her dogs were taken. The seized dogs were spayed or neutered and sent to live in foster homes pending conclusion of the criminal case. Fabrikant was ultimately acquitted but apparently never asked that her seized dogs be returned after the trial. She filed a pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the New York SPCA, several of its employees, and some of the prospective adopters who originally alerted the SPCA about the dogs’ conditions. The complaint included federal claims for malicious prosecution and for violations of her rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Accordingly, although they acted under color of state law, the SPCA defendants were protected by qualified immunity and could not be held liable for the spaying, neutering, or fostering out of Fabrikant’s dogs. Officers had probable cause to search Fabrikant’s house and arrest her. View "Fabrikant v. French" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to interpret the Minnesota dog owner's liability statute. Respondent Gordon Anderson was injured during an attack on his dog by another dog named Bruno, owned by Respondent Neil Christopherson. Anderson, along with his wife, sued Christopherson and his father, arguing, among other claims, that the Christophersons were strictly liable for Anderson's injuries under Minn. Stat. 347.22. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the Christophersons, holding (1) the Christophersons were not liable under the statute because Bruno's conduct was not focused on Anderson; and (2) Dennis Christopherson was not liable because he was not an "owner" of Bruno, as that term was defined under the statute. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) a dog owner may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a dog's affirmative conduct regardless of the focus of that conduct; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Anderson's injury was a direct and immediate result of Bruno's conduct and whether Dennis Christopherson was an owner of Bruno under the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded for a jury trial on both the question of whether Anderson's injuries were caused by Bruno's conduct under section 347.22 and also the question of whether Dennis Christopherson was an "owner" of Bruno under the statute. View "Anderson v. Christopherson" on Justia Law

Nestle’s BEGGIN’ STRIPS registered mark for pet treats has been in continuous use since 1988 and has been registered since 1989. Midwestern manufactures and sells pet treats and filed an intent-to-use application with the Patent and Trademark Office, seeking to register the mark WAGGIN’ STRIPS for pet food and edible pet treats. Nestle opposed registration, arguing likelihood of confusion between the two marks. The district court ruled in favor of Nestle, finding likelihood of confusion. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court properly admitted evidence submitted by Nestle. View "Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant’s llama escaped its pen and wandered off and he was charged with misdemeanor abandonment under the Illinois animal cruelty statute. Rather than hire a lawyer, defendant pled guilty and paid a $525 fine. Three years later, he pled guilty to a federal charge for possession of several hundred marijuana plants. The marijuana conviction called for a mandatory minimum 10 years in prison. But for the misdemeanor llama conviction, defendant could have avoided the mandatory minimum by qualifying for the statutory safety valve, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), and his guideline sentencing range would have been 18 to 24 months in prison. Counting the llama conviction as one criminal history point, his second point, prevented use of the safety valve, which is limited to defendants with no more than one point. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence of 10 years, finding that the llama conviction is similar to misdemeanors listed in U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c) as offenses that should not count for any criminal history points. Application of that provision would have allowed the district court to reach the result that it felt was just here. . View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law