Justia Animal / Dog Law Opinion Summaries

Susan Overfield was charged with assault and disturbing the peace after appearing to speak at a City Commission meeting about perceived conflicts of interest between City officials and the Animal Foundation of Great Falls. Overfield subsequently sued the City. Before the City and Overfield settled the case, the district court concluded (1) the Animal Foundation, its trustee, and its attorney (Petitioners), who were non-parties in the underlying case, were in contempt for wrongfully redacting information from documents produced to Overfield, and (2) the Foundation was in contempt for failing to appear at a deposition with subpoenaed documents. After the case was settled, the district court entered an order awarding Overfield attorney fees against the Petitioners based on the contempt orders. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the contempt orders of the district court, holding that the district court properly considered and decided the contempt issues below without referral to another judge, and the contempt orders were supported by substantial evidence; but (2) vacated the district court's order to arrest the trustee, the court's imposition of sanctions against an attorney who filed a protective order on behalf of the Foundation, and the court's order awarding attorney fees. Remanded. View "Animal Found. of Great Falls v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This case involved the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (Service) removal of the Yellowstone grizzly bear from the threatened species list. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the Service failed to articulate a rational connection between the data in the record and its determination that whitebark pine declines were not a threat to the Yellowstone grizzly, given the lack of data indicating grizzly population stability in the face of such declines, and the substantial data indicating a direct correlation between whitebark pine seed availability and grizzly survival production. The court held, however, that the Service's determination regarding the adequacy of the existing regulatory mechanisms was reasonable and reversed the district court. View "Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Serveheen, et al.; " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs bred their dogs to each other and advertised 11 puppies for sale. Undercover animal services officers visited on the pretense of interest in the puppies. Without a warrant or consent, officers re-entered the home and took all the dogs, stating that they could confiscate the dogs because plaintiffs did not have a breeder's license and that if more than one dog were unlicensed, they could seize all the animals. Neither adult dog was licensed. Before the dogs were released, the adult dogs were neutered, all had identification microchips inserted, and plaintiffs purchased a breeder's license and paid $1,020.95. Plaintiffs were never provided written notice of alleged ordinance violations. The dogs contracted infections that required expensive veterinary treatment. The district court rejected plaintiffs' state law and constitutional claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs were not operating a kennel and were not required to obtain a license for a single litter. The court rejected an argument that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using subterfuge, but found that plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to the second, warrantless entry. Characterizing the release of the dogs as having elements of a shakedown, the court found that plaintiffs stated a claim for procedural due process claims. The court rejected substantive due process and equal protection claims. View "O'Neill v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't" on Justia Law

Feld Entertainment, Inc. owned the country's largest collection of endangered Asian elephants, some of whom travel and perform with its famed Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus. In this case, a former barn helper with the circus and an organization dedicated to fighting exploitation of animals alleged that Feld's use of two techniques for controlling the elephants -bullhooks and chains - harmed the animals in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1533(a)(1). The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment. View "ASPCA, et al. v. Feld Entertainment, Inc." on Justia Law

After convicting seven defendants charged with operating a St. Louis area dog-fighting ring, the court sentenced all to a three-year term of supervised release and to payment of $100. Two defendants additionally received sentences of 16 and 18 months of incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the judge did not take on the role of a prosecutor and violate separation of powers by conducting independent research on dog fighting. The judge informed the parties of his research and carefully distinguished information in the memo from evidence related to the defendants. The court adequately justified the sentencing, finding the guidelines inadequate considering the number of dogs, dogs that had to be euthanized, the number of fights, extraordinary cruelty, and the leadership roles of the defendants.View "United States v. Courtland" on Justia Law

Wilgus was arrested for violating the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 668, which prohibits possession of eagle feathers, but excepts possession for religious purposes of Indian tribes. Wilgus is a follower of a Native American faith and blood-brother to a Paiute, but not a member of a recognized tribe, nor is he Indian by birth. He received at least one feather for religious purposes. Following a remand, the district court held that application of the Eagle Act to Wilgus would violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 (RFRA), which prohibits government from substantially burdening religious freedom, except to forward a compelling governmental interest via the least restrictive means. The Tenth Circuit reversed. The government has competing compelling interests in protecting eagles and in preserving Native American religion and culture. The RFRA exception is intended to protect the religion and culture of tribes, not individual practitioners. Tribes are quasi-sovereign political entities; protection of faith practices among the general public might violate the Establishment Clause. The government need not refute every option to satisfy the least restrictive means prong of RFRA; the RFRA exception balances the competing interests. Proposed alternatives, involving creation of a feather repository, opening permits to all sincere adherents to Native American religion, or allowing Native Americans to gift feathers, would either be impractical or have a negative impact on governmental goals.View "United States v. Wilgus" on Justia Law

Respondent Jill Engquist, as parent and natural guardian of minor Amber Engquist, sued Appellants, Steven and Christina Loyas, for injuries Amber sustained as a result of a dog bite that occurred at Appellants' residence. The district court entered judgment in favor of Appellants after finding that Amber provoked the dog to bite her. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the jury instruction given by the district court misstated the meaning of provocation under Minn. Stat. 347.22. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the jury could have found provocation without any consideration of the victim's knowledge of the danger, the jury instructions materially misstated the law and prejudiced Respondent. Remanded for a new trial. View "Engquist v. Loyas" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Romero appealed his three year sentence for aggravated animal cruelty. In 2009, Defendant tied a rope around the neck of "Buddy," a dog belonging to a family in Delta, Colorado, and dragged him to death behind a pick-up truck on federal land. The United States Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence investigation report (PSR), indicating that while Defendant was in jail for killing Buddy and before pleading guilty, he made a series of telephone calls attempting to silence witnesses and procure false grand jury testimony. The PSR recounted Romero’s ten prior felony convictions, poor physical health, mild mental retardation, amphetamine dependence, depression, and “[i]ntermittent [e]xplosive [d]isorder." The presumptive sentence for aggravated animal cruelty was 12-18 months, but that maximum could be doubled under certain circumstances. Upon review of the sentencing court's record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence when sentencing Defendant to 36-months' imprisonment. The Court affirmed the lower court's judgment. View "United States v. Romero" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from an action instituted in the district court to stop the government from rounding up, destroying, and auctioning off wild horses and burros in the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area on the California-Nevada border. Plaintiffs alleged that the government's actions would violate the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act (Wild Horses Act), 16 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that the injunction was moot because the roundup sought to be enjoined had taken place. The court noted that, in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits of their claims, the district court should consider what relief was appropriate. View "In Defense of Animals, et al. v. US Dept. of the Interior, et al." on Justia Law

Rose Pray fell and was injured when a rottweiler broke loose from its owner and dashed across the street toward her. Pray brought an action for damages against the dog owner and the City. As against the City, Pray asserted that it knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the City, ruling that, under Tipton v. Town of Tabor, the city owed Pray no special duty and, therefore, owed no duty to control the conduct of third persons. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in ruling that Pray needed to prove each of the four Tipton elements to establish that a special duty existed, but (2) as a matter of law, Pray did not meet the legal requirements to show such a duty. View "Pray v. City of Flandreau " on Justia Law